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SMEs are conduits for the transformation of economies because they act as catalysts for 
private sector development. However, they face several constraints to accessing finances for 
their growth and development. Hence, by using a secondary dataset from the Central Bank of 
Eswatini that comprises 1,390 loan applicants, an empirical analysis was done using a binary 
logistic regression analysis to assess credit rationing factors preventing SMEs in the Kingdom 
of Eswatini to access DFIs loans for their growth and development. Thus, the objectives of 
the study are to examine the relationships between credit rationing factors and their effects on 
accessing DFI loans in the Kingdom of Eswatini.  
 
Descriptive analysis provided an explanation as to how these factors influence the financing 
of SMEs in the Kingdom of Eswatini.  Pearson’s correlation coefficient was, therefore, 
employed to determine the relationships between credit rationing factors and binary logistic 
regression analysis to examine the effect of these factors on DFIs loans accessibility. This 
method was used to determine the strength of the relationship between loan access and credit 
rationing factors.  
 
The findings show that the age of SMEs and loan amounts are some of the major negative 
factors impacting access to DFIs loans in the Kingdom of Eswatini. A mature SME is less 
constrained to access DFIs loan compared to start-ups and growing SMEs. Furthermore, 
SMEs that apply for sustainable loans are less constrained to access DFIs loans than those that 
apply for unsustainable and very high amounts.  
 
It is, therefore, concluded that DFIs in the Kingdom of Eswatini apply credit rationing in 
dispersing loans to SMEs. DFIs should link their loan amount to demands and to the period 
of existence, as only well established and matured SMEs have an added advantage in 
accessing DFIs loans. For these reasons, it is recommended that economic policy makers 
should devise loan access policies that suit start-ups and growing SME for their conducive 
development and growth. This policy is vital because SMEs have a pivotal role to play in the 
overall economic growth of the Kingdom of Eswatini. 
 
 




Table of Contents 
 
Plagiarism Declaration ....................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ ii 
Abstract............................................................................................................................. iii 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. vii 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................. viii 
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................... ix 
CHAPTER ONE ................................................................................................................ 1 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Background and Context of the Study ....................................................................... 1 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem ........................................................................... 4 
1.3 Research Objective ................................................................................................... 6 
1.4 Research Question .................................................................................................... 7 
1.5 Research Hypotheses ................................................................................................ 7 
1.6 Significance of the Study .......................................................................................... 7 
1.7 Scope of the study ..................................................................................................... 8 
1.8 Limitations of the Study ............................................................................................ 8 
1.9 Organisation of the study .......................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................................................. 10 
LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................... 10 
2.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 10 
2.1 Theoretical framework ............................................................................................ 10 
2.1.1 The credit rationing concept ............................................................................. 10 
2.1.2 The credit rationing theory ............................................................................... 11 
2.1.3 The adverse selection effect ............................................................................... 13 
2.1.4 The adverse incentive (moral hazard) effect .................................................... 14 
2.2 Forms of credit rationing ......................................................................................... 14 
2.2.1 Lender imposed credit rationing ...................................................................... 14 
2.2.2 Self-imposed credit rationing ............................................................................ 15 
2.2.3 Basis for credit rationing ................................................................................... 15 
2.3 Critique of the credit rationing theory ..................................................................... 16 
2.4.1 Collateral and credit rationing ......................................................................... 19 
2.4.2 Loan amount and credit rationing .................................................................... 20 




2.4.4 Interest rate and credit rationing...................................................................... 22 
2.4.5 Enterprise age and credit rationing .................................................................. 23 
2.4.6 Enterprise location and credit rationing .......................................................... 24 
2.4.7 Gender and credit rationing.............................................................................. 25 
2.5 Credit rationing in Eswatini .................................................................................... 27 
2.6 Definition of and Classification of SMEs for the Study ........................................... 28 
2.7 Importance of Financial Institutions in SME Development...................................... 29 
2.8 Chapter summary .................................................................................................... 30 
CHAPTER THREE ......................................................................................................... 32 
METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................... 32 
3.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 32 
3.1 Research Design and approach ................................................................................ 32 
3.2 Sample and data source ........................................................................................... 33 
3.3 Analytical approach and variables used ................................................................... 34 
3.4 Analysing the factors impacting SMEs’ access to debt finance in Eswatini ............. 35 
3.5 Statistical Assumptions of Logistic Regression ....................................................... 38 
3.6 Chapter Summary ................................................................................................... 39 
CHAPTER FOUR ........................................................................................................... 40 
DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS ................................................... 40 
4.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 40 
4.1 Descriptive statistical analysis of explanatory variables........................................... 40 
4.2 Relationships between credit-rationing factors that affect SMEs in accessing DFI     
loans in Eswatini – Correlation Analysis ................................................................. 46 
4.3 Factors associated with loan access by SMEs – Logistic regression ......................... 48 
4.4 Impact of credit rationing in Eswatini ..................................................................... 52 
4.5 Discussion of the results.......................................................................................... 52 
CHAPTER FIVE ............................................................................................................. 58 
SUMMARY, CONCUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................... 58 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 58 
5.2 Objective of the study ............................................................................................. 58 
5.3 Study methodology ................................................................................................. 58 
5.4 Summary of the work done ..................................................................................... 59 
5.5 Summary of the findings ......................................................................................... 59 




5.7 Recommendations ................................................................................................... 62 
5.8 Suggestion for future research ................................................................................. 62 















































List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Expected Return With Respect To Interest Rate ........................................... 12 
 
Figure 2: Pure (Type 1) Credit Rationing ..................................................................... 13 
 
Figure 3: Forms Of Credit Rationing ........................................................................... 14 
 
Figure 4: Loan Characteristics Which Trigger Sme Credit Rationing ........................... 16 
 
Figure 5: Distribution Of Rejection By Gender Of Sme Owners .................................. 43 
 
Figure 6: Distribution Of Rejection Of Smes By Location ........................................... 43 
 
Figure 7: Distribution Of Rejected Smes By Their Existence Period ............................ 44 
 
Figure 8: Percent Distribution Of Loan Amounts By Categories .................................. 44 
 


















List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Definition Of Smes For This Study .................................................................. 29 
 
Table 2: Variables In The Model ................................................................................... 35 
 
Table 3: Description Of Discrete Variables Used In The Analysis ................................. 41 
 
Table 4: Description Of Continuous Variables Used In The Analysis ............................ 42 
 
Table 5: Bivariate Distribution Of Categorised Collaterals And Loan Amounts Of      
Applicants ........................................................................................................ 46 
 
Table 6: Correlation Analysis Of Socio-Economic Factors That Affect Smes’ Access To 
Dfi Services In Eswatini ................................................................................... 47 
 
Table 7: Logistic Regression Analysis Of Factors Associated With Financial Services 
























List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act 
ADB  African Development Bank 
CBE  Central Bank of Eswatini  
DFU  Financial Development Unit 
DFI  Development Finance Institutions 
EU  European Union 
ESEPARC Eswatini Economic Policy Analysis and Research Centre 
FIs  Financial Institutions 
FINCORP Eswatini Development Finance Cooperation 
HDI  Human Development Index 
KoE  Kingdom of Eswatini 
LAS  Loan Apllication Status 
LAMOUNT Loan Amount 
MFI  Microfinance Institutions 
OECD  Organization for Economic Coorporation and Development  
RSA   Republic of South Africa 
SACU  Southern Africa Customs Union 
EDSB  Eswatini Development and Savings Bank 
SDG  Sustainable Development Goal 
EIDC  Eswatini Industrial Development Bank 
SME  Small and Medium Enterprises 
SSA  Sub-Saharan Africa 
UNDP  United Nationa Development Programme 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
VIF  Variance Inflation Factor 







This chapter presents a background to this study. It provides a basis for understanding the 
subsequent chapters of this report. It begins with a background to the key issues the study 
contends with. It presents the research objectives, research questions and significance of the 
study, which together underscore the purpose for carrying out this study. The scope of the 
study and the limitations of the study are discussed in the latter part of this chapter to put the 
study in perspective. The chapter then ends with a preview of the structure of the remaining 
segment of this report.  
1.1 Background and Context of the Study 
 Sannajust, A. (2014) observed that Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) play a vital role 
in an economy. The researcher noted that SMEs are conduits for the transformation or 
transitioning of economies because they act as catalysts for private sector development and 
they play a crucial role as innovators. The recognition of these key roles played by SMEs has 
also been increasingly acknowledged by public policy makers and a range of initiatives, 
policies and policy frameworks at both the national and supranational levels. These various 
initiatives have been developed in order to support, promote and grow the SME sector. In the 
World Bank’s report on SMEs of 2017 on what is happening to the Missing Middle, the 
authors remarked on how following the dislocation of the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, 
policy makers worldwide including the European Union (EU), the G20, Organization for 
Economic Coorporation and Development (OECD) and the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
focused their increasing attention on strengthening the SME sector in order to build greater 
economic resilience worldwide (United Nations, 2017). 
 
Among these initiatives in 2010, the G20 launched its “SME Finance Challenge,” and 
published its policy paper on “Scaling-Up SME Access to Financial Services in the 
Developing World”. The World Bank’s Finance and Markets Global Practice developed its 
“SME Action Plan”. In 2017, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), recognising the 
importance of these enterprises, decided to declare 27 June the “Micro, Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises Day” to raise public awareness on their contribution to sustainable 




support the growth and expansion of the SMEs, but most SMEs fail to meet the criteria that 
would qualify them for dedicated funding from a number of Financial Institutions (FIs) and 
DFIs (Mutezo, 2015). 
 
The Kingdom of Eswatini (KoE) has equally not been spared from the challenges associated 
with access to finance by SMEs (Sithole, 2018). The KoE is a land-locked country covering 
an area of approximately 17,360 km². The population of the KoE is estimated at around 1.4 
million as of 2019 and is classified as a low-middle income country and has a Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), at market prices, of US $3.43 billion, (FINCORP, 2017). Mostly surrounded 
by Republic of South Africa (RSA), the KoE depends on the RSA for about 60 percent of its 
exports and for more than 90 percent of its imports. According to Dlamini (2018), the 
Kingdom’s currency is pegged at par to the South African Rand, effectively relinquishes the 
KoE’s monetary policy to the RSA. The KoE Government is heavily dependent on customs 
duties from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and worker remittances from RSA 
to supplement domestically earned income (African Development Bank, 2013). 
 
The real GDP growth slowed from 2.5 per cent in 2014 to 1.7 per cent in 2015. The main 
reason for this was argued to be the drought that the country experienced in The KoE and a 
very poor performance in key export destinations, notably RSA (Hwarire, 2012). This was 
compounded by the country’s loss of eligibility to the privileges that flow from the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in January 2015. The KoE’s GDP per capita makes it 
a lower-middle income country, but its income distribution is highly skewed, with an 
estimated 20 percent of the population controlling 80 percent of the nation’s wealth (Dlamini, 
2018). Despite its classification as a low middle-income country, the incidence of poverty is 
high, with an estimated 63 percent of the population living below the poverty line, according 
to African Development Bank (ADB) 2013 report. These challenges highlight the need for 
The KoE to increase the number and size of SME’s and to attract foreign direct investment to 
help address social challenges and improve the quality of life for the population of Eswatini, 
(ADB, 2013). 
 
After losing its benefits under AGOA, The KoE lost thousands of jobs which further worsened 
the untenable high unemployment rate, (FINCORP, 2017). The country has a low Human 
Development Index (HDI). This is a composite statistic of life expectancy, education and per 




The KoE was ranked 138 on this index, according to 2018 United Nations Human 
Development Programme (UNDP) Report. The KoE’s HDI score of 0.608was mainly due to 
the high mortality rate, underdeveloped labour markets and mistrust of national government 
(UNDP, 2019). 
 
With rapidly increasing urbanisation, access to sanitation, electricity and waste management 
services are becoming a major challenge to municipal authorities (Alibhai et al., 2017). To 
address these challenges, the government has committed to prioritising urban development 
through initiatives such as the urban development programme (IFC, 2010). The urban 
development programme is aimed at increasing urban management efficiency and improving 
living conditions of low-income urban households by providing basic services and housing 
(Adisa et al., 2014). The programme includes the rehabilitation and expansion of city roads, 
development of new solid waste sites, provision of solid waste equipment and relocation of 
15 kilometres of power lines. Furthermore, the programme provides rehabilitation and 
expansion of water and sewerage services, including refurbishing existing and constructing 
new sewage treatment and water supply facilities. It also involves a water loss reduction 
programme and residential housing sites, including on-site infrastructure for 5,000 upgraded 
as well as in-fill housing sites (Sithole, 2017). 
 
Improved infrastructure resulting from this programme will be beneficial to SMEs and 
improved infrastructure creates opportunities for SMEs whose expanded products and 
services would be sold to government (OECD, 2015). Eswatini’s economic growth, according 
to the Central Bank’s annual report, is projected to be low because of the slowdown in 
economic activity in the primary and the tertiary sectors. Agricultural activities were 
negatively affected by the drought (2015 – 2016), while the mining sector experienced poor 
performance in 2016 owing to unfavourable international prices. These unfavourable 
developments prompted a rethink and change in focus for countries like Eswatini. It became 
necessary to reduce the country’s heavy reliance on the volatile agricultural sector and venture 
into industrialisation in order to minimise commodity price fluctuations risk, stabilise 
revenues for firms, increase employment and reduce the trade deficit (Sithole, 2017). 
 
This quest to change focus recognised SMEs as very important stakeholders in the new 
economic development agenda for job creation and economic growth (Dlamini, 2018). Most 




requiring travellers with minors to submit unabridged birth certificates has greatly affected 
the SMEs in this sector (Nzonde, 2018). Another development that impacted the Eswatini 
economy, particularly the textile and apparel industry, is the termination of Eswatini’s benefits 
under AGOA, which significantly reduced business activity in this sector (Sithole, 2017). This 
has also affected foreign direct investments in the sector. Even though there have been some 
good prospects in the construction sector due to public sector projects such as the International 
Convention Centre and many road infrastructure construction projects, SMEs hardly operate 
in this sector because of the smallness of their sizes and consequent e capital constraint 
(Sithole, 2017).  
 
According to the Eswatini Economic Policy Analysis and Research Centre (ESEPARC) 
(2019), during their presentation at a public lecture on “SMEs and Industrialisation: 
Materialising SDGs 8 & 9 in Eswatini”, if adequate and satisfactory finance is availed to 
SMEs, then SMEs in the KoE are ready to play a vital role in promoting growth to the Eswatini 
economy. OECD (2015) stated that SMEs are the engine that drives most economies; 
however, for the SMEs to play this vital role, FDIs providing financial support to the SMEs 
need to understand the challenges that the SMEs are facing. In the case of Eswatini, the 
ESEPARC Research Economist stated that one of the major challenges faced by SMEs in 
Eswatini is that of funding gaps (Mohammed, 2019). OECD (2015) noted that SMEs ventures 
are acting as barriers to the growth and development of the SME sector resulting in the sector 
being unable to contribute effectively to economic growth. Understanding these challenges is, 
therefore, a key step towards seeking solutions, which, when found and properly applied, 
would allow the SMEs to overcome the challenges and play their expected crucial roles in 
economic development.  
SMEs must be developed to take their rightful place as the ‘engine of growth’ of the economy 
of Eswatini.  This means enabling them to understand and circumvent the obstacles that limit 
their operations. The literature identifies a ‘capital deficiency gap’ as the most formidable and 
conspicuous of the challenges SMEs face, ahead of entrepreneur expertise, and other obstacles 
(Sithole, 2017).  
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 
Eswatini SMEs have a very crucial role to play in the country’s economic growth and 




structure of Eswatini and sources of revenue reveal a vulnerability gap which only Swazi 
entrepreneurs can fill in order to take charge of the commanding heights of the economy.  
The economy of Eswatini is heavily reliant on the agriculture and agro-industry (sugar, citrus 
and wood pulp). In addition, revenue from the common SACU revenue pool has been the 
major source of central government revenue. The agricultural sector, because of its heavy 
dependence on the weather, has, however, proved to be incapable of giving the stable financial 
foundation on which an economy can reliably stand; the same applies to revenue from the 
common SACU pool (Sithole, 2018). 
 Eswatini’s plausible option of an economic livewire is the SME sector. This is because, 
firstly, the market for industrial goods is too small to support viable manufacturing industries. 
Secondly, SMEs employ over 50 per cent of the population and, according to the literature, 
demonstrated a high degree of resilience during the depression of the 1990s. Studies by 
international organisations have attested to the ability of the SMEs to promote growth in 
developing economies if proper nurturing is undertaken in terms of appropriate policy coupled 
with sound technical and financing services (Sannajust, A. (2014); UN Report, 2017; Dlamini, 
2018). 
The literature indicates that Eswatini government has, as far back as 1990, initiated 
interventions aimed at helping SMEs to overcome the marked challenges plaguing them 
(ESEPARC, 2019). However, studies recently carried out show that capital still remains a 
constraint and access to FI lending is as difficult as ever (Dlamini, 2018).  The Financial 
Development Unit (DFU) of the Central Bank of Eswatini (CBE) has not been able to extend 
the initiatives to cover rural areas and informal sectors (Dlamini, 2018). 
An ADB (2013) report indicated that SME lending in Eswatini is being incapacitated by 
unfavourable SMEs’ operating environment and ineffectiveness of the interventions (ADB, 
2013). Currently, Dlamini (2018) did not only list a number of problems still limiting effective 
SMEs operations in Eswatini, but also highlighted the fact that funding of SMEs in Eswatini 
is not sustainable. This is despite the efforts of SME funding institution like FINCORP to 
instill the culture of responsible borrowers’ behavior among SMEs for a considerable number 
of years.  
The above shows SMEs in Eswatini have a funding gap with a deficiency in financing for 




OECD (2016) stated that SMEs with such a funding gap also tend to be under-capitalised and 
opaque resulting in most of them being unable to grow and self-sustain, thereby hindering 
them from contributing effectively to economic growth.  
 
Due to the problems of accessing bank credit, a large proportion of Eswatini SMEs rely more 
on self-financing in the form of personal savings, loans/donations from family and friends as 
well as retained earnings. According to Dlamini (2018), these forms of financing are not 
adequate to finance SMEs and for their growth. The implication, therefore, is that SMEs do 
not always have adequate credit to meet their financial needs at different levels of growth. 
 
Studies done on SMEs financing in Eswatini include but not limited to those done by Fadiran 
(2005), Hlatshwako (2012), Dlamini (2017), and Dlamini and Mohammed (2018). These 
studies focused on descriptive analysis with no real modelling that takes into account the 
nature of variables used. Fadiran (2005) analysed the effects of financial assistance on SMEs 
in the KoE. Hlatshwako (2012) analysed challenges that hinder SMEs growth and attain their 
maximum performance. Dlamini (2017) focused on analysing social entrepreneurship in the 
financial sector to determine its contribution and performance, and the extent to which it is 
robust as a sustainable model for attaining financial inclusion. Another study on SME 
financing was done by Dlamini and Mohammed (2018), which focused on identifying the 
factors that influence choice of credit sources by SMEs in the agriculture sector. In addition 
to all the studies on SMEs in the KOE, this study goes beyond descriptive analysis by 
incorporating inferential analysis that considers the nature of the relationships of variables 
through application of Binary Logistics Regression Analysis. This is so as most of the 
variables used are categorical including the dependent variable that might not be linearly 
related. 
As stated above by Sithole (2018), Dlamini (2018) and ESERPAC (2019), SME in Eswatini 
are unable to access DFI lending and this has stifled their growth. This study is thus prompted 
by the need to investigate why SMEs in Eswatini are not able to access finance from DFIs 
resulting in the persistence of the ‘funding deficiency gap’ crippling Eswatini SMEs.   
1.3 Research Objective 
It is an undeniable fact that SMEs foster economic development and growth of a country, such 
that the KoE introduced several initiatives including financial services to help SMEs attain 




relationships between credit rationing factors and their effects on accessing DFI loans in the 
KoE.    
 
1.4 Research Question 
To achieve the above objective, the following research question was addressed by this study: 
• How do credit-rationing factors such as collateral, interest rates, location, age of 
SMEs, loan term, gender of SME owner and loan amounts influence SMEs’ access to 
DFI loans in Eswatini? 
1.5 Research Hypotheses 
This study investigated factors that affect SMEs’ access to DFI loans in Eswatini by 
concentrating on credit supply related characteristics which were deemed to be more relevant 
in explaining the credit rationing behaviour of DFIs. These factors include loan amount 
request, age of SME, location, gender of SME owner, loan term, collateral offered and interest 
rate. Therefore, the research question was translated into the following null hypotheses based 
on the literature.  
H1: Collateral does not affect SMEs access to DFI services in Eswatini 
H2: Interest rate does not affect SMEs access to DFI services in Eswatini 
H3: Loan amount does not affect SMEs access to DFI services in Eswatini 
H4: Age of SMEs does not affect SMEs access to DFI services in Eswatini 
H5: Location of SMEs does not affect SMEs access to DFI services in Eswatini 
H6: Gender of SME owner does not affect SMEs access to DFI services in Eswatini 
H7: Loan term does not affect SMEs access to DFI services in Eswatini 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
The role of credit rationing theory in the banking sector has been a subject of intense 
discussion mainly in the context of the recent global crisis (OECD, 2012) during which bank 
lending is reduced and credit sources tend to dry up more rapidly for small firms than larger 
ones (ECD, 2013a). This study is of significance to the different groups of people:   
 
1. Academia and researchers – the methodological approach 
The results of the study addressed a literature gap resulting from limited research and 
methodology in the study area with regards to Eswatini; and therefore, it is of valuable 
assistance to those in academia. The findings of the study will also contribute to the body of 




research findings and analysis are of great significance to those who wish to do further 
research on this topic especially exploration of other additional variables that affect loan 
access. This research is also expected to add to the existing literature on debt financing and 
SME profitability. 
 
2. SME Financing Policy formulation and development – The Government 
Policy makers need adequate, relevant and reliable information to formulate effective policies. 
The findings of the study inform policy makers in areas that need to be addressed, especially 
formulation of inclusive and participatory policies that involve all stakeholders in both SMEs 
and DFIs. The current policies in the banking sector are more political, with more of directives 
than considering DFIs views that will enhance SMEs’ access to DFI lending in the Kingdom 
of Eswatini. 
1.7 Scope of the study 
The study focused on the factors affecting SMEs’ access to lending from DFIs for the KoE in 
its entirety. The primary analysis unit of this study are SMEs in the four regions of Eswatini 
(namely Lubombo, Shiselweni, Manzini and Hhohho regions). The CBE and DFIs operations 
in Eswatini cover all the four regions of the KoE. These entities are involved in SME financing 
as DFIs provide the financing to SMEs while the Central Banks sets up the regulatory 
environment for SME and has a Unit which is in charge of SME financing. It is imperative to 
note that there are various factors that affect SMEs’ access to lending ranging from individual 
demographic characteristics to firm characteristics. This study is, however, limited to selected 
SME characteristics, namely loan size/loan amount, collateral on loan, interest rates, location, 
age of SME, gender of SME owner, and loan term. These factors were selected as they were 
viewed by Mutezo (2015) to be the barriers which cause the SME funding gap. 
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
The first challenge which was encountered in the conduct of this research was accessing the 
DFIs to collect data. DFIs have policies that govern the release of client information that is 
deemed to be confidential. During the conduct of this study, confidentiality policies of DFIs 
was a barrier to successfully obtaining adequate information relevant to this study. According 
to Sanders et al., (2013), accessibility challenges on data collection may impact on the 
credibility of research findings. This accessibility challenge was overcome by establishing 
reliance on secondary data which was collected from the DFIs. Another challenge that may 




such as educational level of the applicant, marital status, household size, type of SME (agro-
sector, manufacturing, and service), and credit history. These variables should be included in 
a future research. The study was also faced with financial and time resource constraints, hence 
the use of secondary dataset obtained from the CBE that contained almost all information 
about loan applicants (SMEs) in the KoE 
1.9 Organisation of the study 
The dissertation is organised into five main chapters. Chapter One gives an overview of the 
background and context of the study. This covers the problem statement, the main objective 
of the study, the specific objectives of the study, the research questions, the significance of 
the study, and finally, the limitation of the study. Chapter Two examines the relevant literature 
concerning the study. This comprises the theoretical literature, the conceptual frameworks and 
the empirical literature on SMEs access to lending among financial institutions in the 
Kingdom of Eswatini. Chapter Three presents the methodology of the study, as well as other 
methods of analysis, covering the research design, the target population of the study, the 
statistical analysis tools that led to the conclusions and recommendations. Chapter Four 
focuses on the results and discusses the findings of the study with respect to secondary dataset. 
The chapter presents the summarised results presented using tables and graphs. The chapter 
also discusses the findings of the study relative to the empirical literature. Chapter Five draws 



















This chapter presents a review of literature in the area of study. This is done to provide an 
update of the current state of knowledge in the area of study, to place the study in context and 
to identify and define the theoretical framework for the study. This chapter first reviews the 
credit rationing theory for the study. Secondly, the definition of SMEs is discussed, and the 
characteristics of the SMEs and the entrepreneur are reviewed. Thirdly the constraints faced 
by SMEs in accessing credit, and finally, the strategies that can be adopted to enhance ease of 
access to lending by SMEs are reviewed. 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
 
2.1.1 The credit rationing concept 
Credit rationing is defined by Jote (2018) as the steps that are put in place by lenders in order 
to restrict, limit or deny credit to borrowers on the basis of their creditworthiness. In the same 
vein, Sylvester et al. (2013) also viewed credit rationing as the act by lenders of placing limits 
on the supply of additional credit to those who seek funds even if the borrowers are willing 
and committed to paying high rates of interest on the loans.  
 
From the above, credit rationing refers to a scenario where the demand for credit exceeds 
supply in the market equilibrium, which is termed as market failure. This market failure occurs 
when financial institutions, as a result of imperfect information within the credit market, are 
unable to identify perfectly ex-ante their client’s profile and cannot correctly fix the interest 
rate with regard to risk resulting in lenders taking measures to reduce the exposure to credit 
risk (Jote, 2018).  
 
According to Adesuwa (2016), credit rationing takes place once the expected rate of return 
does not increase monotonously with the interest rate. Two reasons make the relationship non-
monotonous: a rise in the credit cost that can discourage the least risky borrowers because 
their returns, in case of successful projects, are below those of riskier borrowers, and thus will 
decrease the lenders’ average return (adverse selection). In the same way, an increase in the 




Since SMEs rely heavily on DFI debt finance, this restricted access has a negative effect on 
the investment in new profitable projects and their growth (Jote, 2018). 
 
2.1.2 The credit rationing theory 
The credit rationing theory finds its roots from Jaffee and Modigliani (1969) and Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) and has  subsequently been revised and reinforced within the finance discipline. 
Within the premise of credit rationing, accessing finance is restricted and curtailed by the 
existence of information asymmetry challenges between the providers of funds (lenders) and 
those seeking for funds (borrowers), resulting in market failure in the provision of funds to 
SMEs (Ghimire and Abo, 2013; Huang, et al., 2014). As a result of this market failure, a 
situation arises where demand for bank credit becomes excess as compared to its supply 
causing this imperfection in the market (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In the context of SMEs in 
Eswatini, the credit rationing is the cause of the financing gap among SMEs, which is depicted 
by the discrepancy which is existent between the demand for credit and credit supply by DFIs 
(Mazanai and Fatoki, 2012).  
 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) considered a risk neutral bank facing a competitive market for loans 
and deposits. They assumed the bank wishes to maximise its profits by deciding on loan 
amounts to extend at the prevailing interest rate for loans and deposits respectively. It is also 
assumed that the prospects of default become higher when interest rates on loans are increased. 
In addition, an assumption is made that up to a certain level of interest rates, the prospects of 
defaulting by borrowers increases less than proportionally as the interest rates are increased. 
Beyond that particular level the probability of default increases more than proportionally as 
interest rate increases  (Luci, n.d). The bank’s expected return with these assumptions is shown 














Figure 1: Expected return with respect to interest rate 
 
Source:  Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) 
 
Figure 1 plots the expected returns of the bank against interest rates. The bank’s expected 
return is not a monotonic function of interest rate  (Luci, n.d). At a certain point r* the bank’s 
expected return will eventually begin to decrease with any further increases in the rates of 
interest.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) describe this region as the interior bank optimal rate of 
interest. 
 
DFIs tend not to lend to borrowers who offer to pay a higher interest rate in excess of r*. A 
bank’s judgement based on the thought that such types of loans may be more riskier as 
compared to average loans at the interest rate r*. Therefore, if the expected return for a loan 
issued at an interest rate above r* is below the return that is expected on loans which the 
financial institituition will be earning. A situation will prevail where there will be the absence 
of competitive forces to lead to supply to equaling and equating to demand, hence credit will 
be rationed  (Carbo-Valverde et al., 2015). 
 
The supply curve of loan finance has a positive slope as expected returns increase with the 
increase of interest rates. The slope turns negative when the expected returns start decreasing. 











Figure 2: Pure (Type 1) Credit Rationing 
 
Source:  Luci, (n.d) 
 
If the demand, D, and the supply for loans, S, intersect at or above the bending point of the 
supply curve there is a normal equilibrium where demand equals supply. If supply shifts to S’ 
and the intersection occurs at ‘a’ above the bending point the bank may not have incentive to 
achieve the new equilibrium because beyond the bending point its expected returns decrease. 
The bank stays at r* even if an excess demand exist  (Luci, n.d). According to  Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981), two reasons explain the non-monotonic nexus between the expected return and 
the rate of interest, adverse selection effects and adverse incentive (moral hazard) effects  
(Luci, n.d). 
 
2.1.3 The adverse selection effect 
Adverse selection effect is a result of the failure of interest rate to act as a screening device.  
Carbo-Valverde, et al., (2015) argue that borrowers who choose relatively safer projects 
generally have a lower threshold for interest rate, beyond which they will not apply for a loan. 
There is also a group of borrowers who choose riskier projects, given the expected rate of 
return, and these have a higher threshold of interest rate. With increasing interest rates, 
borrowers with safe projects drop out of the market, leaving borrowers with risky projects. 
This is a case of adverse selection. At this point applicants who are keen to foot higher rates 
of interest on loans will be viewed as being riskier. This lowers the expected value of the loan 





2.1.4 The adverse incentive (moral hazard) effect 
The moral hazard effect is largely due to the incentive role of the rate of interest.  Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) opined that increases in the rates of interest has an effect of shifting the choices 
of those seeking funds (both existing and new ones) towards much riskier projects. These 
projects tend to have a negative effect of reducing the lender’s expected return. 
2.2 Forms of credit rationing 
Across the body of literature two (2) overall forms of rationing are identified by Berger and 
Udell (1995); Han, et al, (2009); Ghimire and Abo (2013); Mutezo (2015); Carbo-Valverde 
et al. (2015),  that can be broadly classified as 1) lender imposed credit rationing and 2) self-
credit rationing as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Forms of Credit Rationing 
 
Source: Adapted from Mutezo (2015) 
 
2.2.1 Lender imposed credit rationing 
Lender imposed credit rationing represents a scenario where lenders are unwilling to advance 
credit to borrowers who demand funds and SME businesses face the likelihood of being 
rationed as they are viewed by lenders to be riskier than larger business entities (Carbo-
Valverde et al., 2015). Mutezo (2015) attributed this credit rationing to “information 
asymmetry” as lenders find it difficult to reliably determine their credit worthiness, therefore 
SME businesses are more vulnerable to be credit rationing than larger business enterprises.  
 
Furthermore, according to Ghimire and Abo (2013), the bank’s credit rationing decision is 
driven to a larger extent by firm specific factors like (the firm’s business experience, the firm’s 




by the applicant, the term of the loan, collateral levels required for the loan and the rate of 
interest on the loan. FIs have formal procedures which they follow and adhere to when SMEs 
apply for loan and these procedures include screening the SMEs, evaluation of the credit 
worthiness of the SME business and determining the quantity limits for a loan (Ghimire and 
Abo, 2013). During the screening phase/stage, the loan applicant is interviewed by FIs to 
determine their credit worthiness (in this case the SME businesses). The relevant officer of 
FIs who is in charge of this process, will assess the viability of the applicant’s business, the 
credit history of the applicant, the management team for the venture and the available 
collateral among other issues. During the loan quantification stage, the lender will determine 
and fix the optimal loan amount for the applicant based on the information evaluated in the 
screening stage (in most cases the amount pegged by the lender tends to be less than the 
amount expected by the applicant) and also put in place a loan repayment period in the loan 
contract with reduces the bank’s overall credit risk. 
 
2.2.2 Self-imposed credit rationing 
Self-imposed credit rationing was identified by Han et al. (2009), who identified what was 
termed as “self rationing”, and Berger and Udell (1992) who stated that the entities that 
experience credit rationing are mostly small which are still at infancy levels and mostly 
owened by a person who originally founded them. On that preposition, Han et al. (2009) 
opined that “self-rationing” is the likelihood of a borrower deciding not to apply for a loan out 
of the fear that the loan request will be rejected by the potential lenders due to their riskiness 
levels. Similarly as in the lender imposed rationing scenario, Ghimire and Abo (2013) posited 
that an individual’s decision to self-ration and not borrow is attributed by factors like (the 
firm’s business experience, the firm’s turnover and the earnings of the firm) and loan 
characteristics like (the amount being sought by the applicant, the term of the loan, collateral 
levels required for the loan and the rate of interest on the loan). In this scenario, individuals 
self-evaluate their SME businesses and due to self-discouragement, tend not to apply for credit 
from financial institutions hence limiting or rationing the access to credit. 
 
2.2.3 Basis for credit rationing 
Mutezo (2015) stated that with “information asymmetry”, challenges are encountered by 
lenders in reliably identifying credit worthy and non-credit worthy loan applicants and hence 
SME businesses have a higher likelihood of being rationed when compared with larger and 




characteristics, like the firm’s business experience, the firm’s turnover and the earnings of the 
firm, and loan characteristics like the amount being sought by the applicant, the term of the 
loan, collateral levels required for the loan and the rate of interest on the loan. This study 
focuses on aforementioned loan characteristics but added some to enhance and ascertain their 
influence on loan application outcome, namely loan amount demanded, age of SME, location, 
gender of the owner, loan term, collateral offered and interest rate, which are also depicted in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Loan characteristics which trigger SME credit rationing 
 
Source: Adapted from Mutezo (2015), Fatoki & Asah (2011), Lee and Brown (2016) 
 
2.3 Critique of the credit rationing theory 
A number of researchers have critiqued the credit rationing theory and its validity. Findings 
from studies by Arnold and Riley (2009), Su (2010), Mwangi (2012), Beutler and Grobéty 
(2013) found no statistically significant evidence from their research that provide evidence of 
validity of credit rationing. Gou and Huang (2014) noted that a firm that fails to access credit 
from a certain FIhas an option of applying for credit from another FIand ultimately, the firm 
may eventually obtain credit from other lenders. 
 
Another point to note is that the “adverse selection model” by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) is 




world of finance that  assume symetric ex-ante. They place emphasis on explaining how the 
ex-post agency problems that result from a specific borrowing-lending relationship influence 
credit rationing  (Su, 2010). Widya-Hasuti et al. (2018) cited costly verification.  Halme and 
Korpela (2014) focused on money diversion, Sylvester, et al., (2013) cited hidden effort, and 
Haile (2015) highlighted limited enforcement. Nawai and Shariff (2013) showed how poor 
collateral is a binding constraint in finance. A possibility exists to test the significance of 
“random rationing by examining whether the credit rationed borrowers are still rationed if 
they are willing to pledge more collateral, to reduce the loan amount and to add restrictive 
covenants” (Su, 2010). 
 
In conclusion, this theory has been criticized due to its underlying assumption which states 
that those who lend funds have no adequate information on some of the applicant’s 
characteristics. The close-knit character of multiple SMEs business implies that providers of 
finance have adequate knowledge and information on the characteristics of borrowers (Haile, 
2015) resulting in SME being unable to access lending from DFIs and thus being “credit 
rationed by some. This is widely adopted by lending institutions in the application of credit 
among applicants. For the same reason, this study adopted this theory as it is the one being 
followed by Eswatini DFIs. 
 
2.4 The Empirical Literature 
DFIs operate between public aid and private investment and according to Griffith and Smith 
(2012) they provide finance to the private sector for investments that promote development. 
The role of the DFIs worldwide, including the KoE, is made more important by the 
requirement that public authorities should fulfill their responsibilities by ensuring that 
taxpayers’ money is used for socially desirable projects, which are in line with the 
development strategies and industrial policies of a country. The funding by DFIs (scarce 
public resources) should be genuinely additional to private finance. The use of DFI funding 
should lead to the best possible development outcomes, such as increasing job opportunities 
and alleviating poverty (Kwakkenbos and Romero, 2013). Since DFIs are protected by public 
liability and guarantee and are driven by their development mandate, they are supposed to 
invest in projects or areas with higher risk and higher social return. Kwakkenbos and Romero 
(2013) maintained that DFIs and other aid agencies justify their investment in the private 
sector by cooperating with the private sector, so that they can leverage significantly more 





DFIs exist to provide finance to financial institutions that provide long-term capital and know-
how to local small and medium sized businesses, private sector intermediaries which invest 
in underlying private enterprises involved in development projects, and directly to underlying 
private enterprises (Te Velde and Warner, 2007). According to Griffiths and Smith (2012), 
DFIs act in cooperation with government to provide management consultancy and technical 
assistance in general and to specific projects. At the same time, they aim to promote best 
practices in business, governance and environmental standards in the companies in which they 
invest. Since the private sector is associated with economic growth through the creation of 
jobs, profits and other benefits to society, the general purpose of DFIs becomes that of closing 
the gap in the financial market, as they invest in areas where commercial investors would 
normally not in order to play a developmental role. On a larger scale, DFIs aim to invest on a 
sustainable basis by providing the means for developing countries to invest in projects that 
encourage socio-economic development in a way that reduces dependency on aid (Fink, 
2004). Another important role DFIs play is acting as a catalyst to attract and mobilise the 
involvement of other private investors. The success of DFIs in this area is measured by the 
rate at which they are ultimately crowded out of an investment area by private investors (Te 
Velde and Warner, 2007). Access to external finance and the ability to undertake profitable 
investment opportunities are important ingredients for success of any new business and 
ultimately for economic growth and development (Chavis, Kapper and Love, 2011). 
 
The KoE operates with three important DFIs: The Eswatini Development Finance Corporation 
(FINCORP), Eswatini Industrial Development Company (EIDC), and the Eswatini 
Development and Savings Bank (EDSB). Each of these institutions operates with a different 
management structure, market philosophy, and client focus. SME businesses globally 
including the KoE face a multiplicity of challenges in conducting business as compared to 
large enterprises due to the difficulties they encounter in their effort to access finance to start 
up and to grow. The IFC (2010), posited that small businesses tend to encounter more 
challenges as compared to medium-sized firms while on the other hand, medium-sized 
business enterprises tend to face same challenges compared to larger firms. In developing 
countries, lenders have been seen to be restricting the supply of credit to small businesses and 






OECD (2018) posited that high transaction costs contribute to the inability by SME business 
to access debt from financial institutions. OECD (2018) is of the opinion that “if transaction 
cost of lending is high then the net margin DFIs expect from loans operation do not compare 
favourably against safe investment represented by treasury bonds”. The OECD (2017) echoed 
the same view, that if lender are faced with information asymmetry, they tend to be defensive 
by opting to reduce credit supply in an effort to reduce credit risk and preventing default risk. 
Such actions according to OECD (2017) have a push-up effect on transaction cost as the 
likelihood of default by SMEs becomes higher resulting in lenders resorting to credit rationing 
behaviour to reduce their credit risk exposure. Lenders may therefore resort to avoiding 
lending funds to SMEs or may resort to increasing collateral requirements for SME businesses 
thereby creating barriers to access to finance to small start-up businesses and entrepreneurs. 
The following sections discuss factors that determine credit rationing to SMEs worldwide 
including Eswatini. 
 
2.4.1 Collateral and credit rationing 
Collateral, as an extra form of security, can be pledged against credit by a loan applicant (in 
this case the SME) to the lender (the DFIs) as assurance for the loan or rather as a second 
source of loan repayment in case of repayment violation. Normally assets such as plant, 
machinery, land, buildings, accounts receivable, and (in some cases) stock (finished or work 
in progress) are considered as possible sources of collateral that the lender can sell to recover 
the amount borrowed to the SME business in the event that the borrower fails to pay the loan 
as per the loan agreement (OECD, 2014).  
 
Carbo-Valverde et al. (2015) argued that just as with interest rates, collateral may also fail to 
act as a sorting and incentive device. They argued that increasing collateral may shift the 
composition of borrowers towards those with riskier projects or encourage borrowers to 
choose riskier projects. Their argument is based on two propositions. 
 
Reduced borrower equity 
A higher collateral required by the bank will reduce the borrower’s equity that could be 
invested in the project, this may force the applicant to select smaller projects. Assuming the 
case that smaller projects have a higher failure probability, increasing collateral could 





Decreasing absolute risk aversion 
Carbo-Valverde et al.  (2015) further argued that the degree of aversion torward risk of 
individuals could decrease as they become wealthier. Increasing collateral will increase the 
relative portion of wealthier but riskier borrowers compared to less wealthy and risk averse 
borrowers who cannot afford higher collateral and hence drop out of the market. Increasing 
collateral could lead to a riskier pool of borrowers. The adverse selection effects could be 
sufficiently strong to cancel out the positive effect that the increase of collateral could have 
on the bank’s expected profit. 
 
In theory, need for collateral requirements in lending agreements is viewed as a mitigating 
strategy or a solution to addressing information asymmetry problems which are viewed to be 
the source of credit rationing and also, if a borrower offers collateral for a loan, this offer of 
collateral is a signalling factor by the borrower to address information asymmetry problems 
(Cerqueiro et al., 2016; Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; Kirschenmann, 2016). In the same vein, 
Mutezo (2015) posited that the availing of collateral by the borrower should reduce credit 
rationing by lenders. Nkuah et al. (2013) also posited that collateral requirements pose a limit 
to the borrower from pursuing very risky ventures and hence addresses the moral hazard 
problem. The same view was shared by Carbo-Valverde et al., (2015), who stated that the 
offering of collateral by a borrower in form of pledged assets makes the borrower more likely 
to manage the loan amount responsibly to protect the pledged assets and this reduces the credit 
risk levels of borrowers. 
 
It can therefore be concluded that collateral has a positive effect of reducing adverse selection, 
and should be capable of ultimately mitigating credit rationing. Also, it can be concluded that 
collateral requirements are capable of preventing moral hazard problems, thereby ensuring 
that those who borrow funds opt for low risk projects. Whether collateral play any role in the 
ability of SMEs to access DFI services in Eswatini, is the intended investigation of this study. 
 
2.4.2 Loan amount and credit rationing 
Limited empirical contributions by scholars like Becchetti et al., (2011) and Kirschenmann 
(2016) have focused on “loan size rationing”, where the lender offers a lower loan size as 
compared to the one which the borrower originally applied for thereby creating a situation 





A study by Kjenstad and Su (2012) concluded that “at the equilibrium interest rate, increasing 
the loan size reduces the average cost of the loan, so the borrower always demands a larger 
loan than what the lender can offer even in a perfect credit market”. In addition, Kjenstad and 
Su (2012) further concluded that before making a loan, banks will comprehensively assess the 
risk of the borrowing enterprises, SMEs’ initial asset size is usually below the critical 
collateral value, which made them unable to transmit their risk levels, and SMEs’ loan size is 
usually below the minimum loan size, which would cause higher costs to banks. Mohamed et 
al. (2019) did a study in Somalia which sought to identify the factors that affect loan 
repayment in Garowe district in Somalia. In this study, it was concluded that the smaller the 
loan amount or size the lower the defaulting rate and vice versa. Thus, when loan size increases 
the likelihood of defaulting also increases and leads to repayment problem.  
 
Loan amount rationing has an impact in overall terms on indivisible projects which SMEs 
seek to invest in. A reduction in the loan size and loan amount will result in an incomplete 
project which in turn will offer the SME business no return thus affecting loan repayment 
performance (Kirschenmann, 2016). Does loan amount play any role in the ability of SMEs 
to access DFI services in Eswatini? This study sought to find out the truth about this factor. 
 
2.4.3 Loan term and credit rationing 
The loan term refers to the loan repayment period for a specific loan borrowed from a bank. 
Kirschenmann (2016) stated that loan period rationing refers to a scenario where lenders prefer 
a shorter loan repayment period for borrowers as compared to longer repayment periods in 
order reduce to their credit risk exposure.  
 
According to Mutezo (2015), lenders will determine the length of a repayment period based 
on how they assess the riskiness of a borrower, thus the money-lending institutions need to 
feel confident that the borrower will be able to repay back their debt on time; hence, from the 
lender’s perspective, the longer the repayment period, the greater the risk to the lender 
(Mutezo, 2015). That means the length of a loan repayment period depends on the kind of 
financial credentials which the SMEs bring to the table and that is inclusive of the credit 
history of the SMEs and factors like collateral.  Does loan term play any role in the ability of 
SMEs to access DFI services in Eswatini? This study wanted to find out the truth about this 





2.4.4 Interest rate and credit rationing 
The interest rate (IR) is the annual fee charged by a lender to a borrower in order for the 
borrower to acquire a loan (Kamunge et al., 2014; Rahman, et al., 2016).  IRs are, therefore, 
the rental charged to the borrower by the lender for the use of the funds. It may also be termed 
as an opportunity cost to lenders for the loss of use of the asset they borrow out (Beck et al., 
2009). If the asset was cash money, the lender could have used the money for own investment 
or for savings. The magnitude of interest would depend on the perceived risk of the borrower. 
The IRs would be low if the borrower is thought to be of low risk, and if the borrower is seen 
as belonging to the high-risk category the interest rates will be higher (Rahman et al.,2016).  
 
Although the term ‘IR’ is a universal concept, few people or businesses are aware of how FIs 
and lenders determine IRs and how it impact on the borrowers’ businesses and in the economy 
at large (Mutezo, 2015). IRs are not universally identical, according to Camba-Mendez et al. 
(2016) and they differ in accordance to the time span of the loan. When IRs go up, banks 
charge more for business finances. Businesses dissipate more of their earnings in servicing 
loans, contrived through FIs as a result of the increased IRs. This decreases their disposable 
income (Berger et al., 2006). 
 
SME owners would not launch new project or invest in expansion when IRs are high. Camba-
Mendez, et al., (2006) revealed that the opposite is true in that when IRs are low firms would 
borrow more voluntarily, invest in new ventures and make more returns. Some smaller banks 
would permit relationship lending to small firms by devising lending schemes that offer 
advantages to the small firms (Rahman et al., 2016). Conversely, larger banks argue that due 
to their size they offer additional advantages to small firms through the availability of 
specialized financial instruments such as factoring that allows small firms to avoid financial 
risks. Foreign banks, on the other hand, claim to bring in more competitive and innovative 
ways of lending techniques that benefit small firms (Beck et al., 2011).  
 
The culmination and competition of these banks is intended to help curb the negative effect 
of high IRs facing small firms. While the conventional belief is that smaller banks allow 
relationship lending and are more available for lending to small firms, nonetheless, small firms 
still face the crunch on prohibitive high IRs (Rahman et al., 2016). Due to the risk factor 
associated with small firms, FIs do impose ‘safe’ IRs (which are always higher than normal 




SMEs form the largest number of banks’ clients, banks prefer to work with large multinational 
conglomerates and governments which offer less risk and higher returns, crowding out most 
of the private sector from the financial system (Gbandi and Amissah, 2014).  
 
Prohibitively high rates of interest would force some SMEs into opting for financing outside 
the formal FIs (Cálice et al., 2012). In Kenya for instance, the so-called Pyramid schemes 
stepped in with the promises of financial rescuing of small firms through soft borrowing free 
from collateral exigencies, and reduced IRs (Kamunge et al., 2014).  
 
In Mozambique, a similar scenario is evident with SMEs opting for the so called Xitique 
financing schemes that offer interest free loans to their members (Cunha, 2014). High IRs 
have made it difficult for start-up SMEs to be launched by potential entrepreneurs (Beutler 
and Grobéty, 2013). A study in Kenya by Ong’olo and Awino (2013) revealed that nearly 
three quarters of new start-up SMEs obtained their initial capital from personal fund, with a 
bit of over ten percent depending on family help. Merely less than 2 percent of start-up SMEs 
got assistance from banks, partially due to high IRs and insistence on collateral. A secondary 
effect of high IRs affects the general population, being that high IRs have negative effect on 
the disposable income that is available to clients. Kamunge et al. (2014) admit that if clients 
have limited funds to spend there would be little demand for goods and services from SMEs. 
In the long run, high IRs can limit company sales, as money that could have been paid for 
SMEs goods and services is diverted to interest payments or savings. Does IR play any role 
in the ability of SMEs to access DFI services in Eswatini? This study wished to find out the 
truth about this factor. 
 
2.4.5 Enterprise age and credit rationing 
Enterprise age refers to the period that an enterprise has been in existence since establishment. 
Another important factor that mitigates the credit rationing is the age of the firms. Diamond 
(1991) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1992), found that in credit rationing, a firm’s age is an 
indicator of the firm’s quality, since longevity may contain a signal for survival ability and 
quality of management, as well as the accumulation of reputational capital. Moreover, the 
information gap is relatively smaller for older firms given their longer track record (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994; Cressy, 1996). In addition, recent studies have indicated t the likelihood of 
credit rationing increases for more innovative firms. Abor and Biekpe (2009) noted that age 




suggested that an enterprise that has been in operation for a long time, subsequently build a 
strong reputation over the years with the formal credit institutions, and hence can easily access 
formal credit. However, start-up firms are more likely to face financing problems and an 
enterprise’s access to finance depends on its stage of development. Evidence by Fatoki and 
Asah (2011) revealed that SMEs established more than five years have a far better chance to 
succeed in their loan applications compared with SMEs that have been in business less than 
five years. Does SMEs’ age play any role in the ability of SMEs to access DFI services in 
Eswatini? This study wished to find out the truth about this factor. 
 
2.4.6 Enterprise location and credit rationing 
The place where an enterprise operates is also one of the determinant factors of credit access 
and this is not just innovative to SMEs that are penalised when trying to obtain finance. 
Another crucial aspect of borrower heterogeneity concerns geographic location. It is now 
increasingly recognised by economic geographers that where a firm is located fundamentally 
shapes its ability to obtain finance (Martin and Sunley, 2015). Owing to organizational and 
technological changes which have reduced the relational proximity between SMEs and DFIs. 
Small firms located in peripheral areas encounter a “liability of distance” (Lee and Brown, 
2016: 23). While this is germane to all SMEs (Degryse et al., 2015; Zhao and Jones-Evans, 
2016), it appears that innovative SMEs located in peripheral areas are particularly 
disadvantaged (Lee and Brown, 2016). Other studies revealed that large national DFIs have a 
“home bias” which constrains local branches from lending to “soft-information intensive 
borrowers, such as small innovative enterprises” (Presbitero et al., 2014: 57). Evidence 
suggested that many of these afore-mentioned issues relate to a structural problem associated 
with so-called “thin markets” where investors and entrepreneurs find it difficult to connect 
with each other outside core geographic areas (Nightingale et al., 2009). Other scholars have 
noted how the weak levels of local competition within some local areas leads to DFIs “cherry 
picking” customers restricting credit to other SMEs (Canales and Nanda, 2012). Recent 
research suggests that thin markets spill over into other forms of SME lending markets in 
peripheral regions which may lead to the use of inappropriate types of finance such as credit 
cards (Brown et al., forthcoming).  
 
Some studies such as those of Guirkinger (2008) and Gine (2010) highlighted the importance 
of location of borrowers on informal credit choice. Using survey data on Thai households in 




enforcement costs (for the DFI) promotes informal financial transactions in rural areas. Gine 
(2010) showed that DFIs are less willing to lend to borrowers whose creditworthiness is 
difficult to evaluate in rural areas and DFIs have limited ability to enforce contracts, when 
compared to informal lenders which makes DFIs reluctant to lend people in rural areas. 
Moreover, the fixed transaction costs of borrowing can be another explanation for the higher 
informal credit usage in rural areas, especially when the amount of credit needed is small. In 
case of borrowing from formal sources, the average fixed cost will be smaller as the loan 
amount increases. Since the formal credit providers are located generally in bigger towns, 
transaction costs are higher for the borrowers that are located in rural areas, moreover the 
enforcement costs are higher for the DFIs in case of lending to borrowers in rural areas. 
 
It is important to note that the credit rationing theory does not suggest that all firms that seek 
credit should be able to access it. Some proponents suggest that any evidence that firms are 
unable to get finance is a market failure. However, this is not true. Theories around market 
failures do not suggest that all firms should get capital, merely that there may be situations 
where firms which are in a perfectly working market, would obtain finance. Does location 
play any role in the ability of SMEs to access DFI services in Eswatini? This study wished to 
find out the truth about this factor. 
 
2.4.7 Gender and credit rationing 
In developing countries such as Eswatini, the explicit concern of access to debt finance for 
women has received global intervention. This is so because women entrepreneurs face many 
more access-to-debt barriers compared to their male counterparts (IFC, 2013). Gender parities, 
especially concerning access to debt finances, are a key issue in promoting economic growth 
and sustainable development in female-owned SMEs. Better delivery of financial debts to 
both female- and male-owned enterprises without partiality will improve the performance of 
SMEs significantly. 
 
Evidence from Cassar (2004) and Irwin and Scott (2010) showed that owners’ characteristics 
such as gender make a difference to a firm’s ability and likelihood of accessing formal credit. 
It is, however, worth underscoring that irrespective of loan type and other relevant factors, 
women microcredit-borrowers have displayed better repayment performance than their male 
counterparts in countries like Bangladesh (Hossain, 1988), Malawi (Hulme, 1991; Khandker 




(Kevane and Wyidick, 2001). In a cross-country study, D’espallier et al., (2011) investigated 
the repayment records of 350 MFIs in 70 countries. Their results confirmed that, ceteris 
paribus, a higher percentage of female clients in DFIs are associated with a lower portfolio 
risk, fewer write-offs, and fewer provisions. In this study, we seek to identify the proximal 
causes of such gender differentiated behaviour in the repayment of microcredit.  
 
The origin of gender differences in human behaviour has been a long-debated issue. Most 
theorists who have considered the origins question have taken either an essentialist or a social 
constructionist perspective (Wood and Eagly, 2002). Those subscribing to the essentialist 
perspective, for example, emphasize that men and women are born different and they remain 
so for the rest of their lives because gender differences in behaviour have their roots in biology 
and genetics (Baron-Cohen, 2003; Lawrence, 2003). Neuroscience and evolutionary 
psychology as, two rapidly progressing fields that investigate the proximal causes of 
behaviour, support this point of view. Evolutionary psychologists, for instance, explain gender 
differences in behaviour based on evolutionary principles about gender selection pressures. 
They argued that gender differences in behaviour result from different reproductive pressures 
that ancestral males and females encountered over human history (Gangestad and Simpson, 
2000).  
 
The constructionists, on the other hand, view gender-differentiated behaviour as a context-
dependent outcome of social processes (Geertz, 1974; Williams and Best, 1982; Eagly, 1987; 
Bohan, 1993; Lorber, 1994). According to this view, gender differences in behaviour arise 
from the societal position of women and men through, for instance, the division of labour into 
homemakers and full-time paid employees. Thus, a testable implication of the constructionist 
view is that there should be observation of a reversal of any gender- differentiated behaviour 
in two distinct societies where the roles of men and women are mirror images. This study 
examined the validity of this view in the context of micro loan repayment behaviour.  
 
Although only scant formal studies have so far been undertaken to identify the proximal 
causes of gender differences in the repayment of microcredit, various anecdotal explanations 
prevail in the literature, which are consistent with the constructionist view. One such 
explanation is that women have fewer credit opportunities in developing countries. Thus, in 
order to ensure continued access to credit, they (a) adopt more conservative investment 




access to loans is particularly valuable to women entrepreneurs because, in most developing 
societies, there is limited access to household resources (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 
2010). Another argument is that women clients can be monitored easily by loan officers as 
they stay close to home rather than going out to work like the men (Rahman, 2001; Goetz and 
Gupta, 1996). The essence of these arguments is that gender difference in the repayment of 
microcredit can be explained simply by the roles that women play in a typically male 
dominated society.  
 
However, there are also reasons to believe that gender differences in repayment behavior have 
a natural basis. On the one hand, the act of repaying a loan signals the level of trustworthiness 
of a borrower (Becchetti and Conzo, 2011). On the other hand, psychological and biological 
research suggests that women can be naturally more trustworthy than men. For instance, 
evolutionary psychologists argue that women have historically invested more in raising their 
offspring than men. Ancestral women used to compete with other women in order to attract 
long term mates to protect the future of their offspring. Thus, women evolved, through the 
process of biological evolution – disposition that favours trustworthiness and risk aversion 
(see, for example, Archer, 1996) –  the two critical virtues that may naturally promote better 
loan repayment behaviour among women. Biological research, in this context, suggests (a) 
that the level of trustworthiness is positively associated with the level of oxytocin release in a 
person (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Zak et al.,2005); and (b) that the magnitude of oxytocin release 
is significantly higher among women than men (Carter, 2007). Does gender play any role in 
the ability of SMEs to access DFI services in Eswatini? This study wanted to find out the truth 
about this factor. 
2.5 Credit rationing in Eswatini 
The credit rationing theory as the theoretical lens of this study is applicable in that information 
asymmetry problems exist amongst DFIs and SMEs in Eswatini and according to Cheng 
(2014) have resulted in SMEs self-rationing and not accessing credit and has also resulted in 
lender imposed rationing with lenders not advancing credit (fully or partially) but rather 
resorting to screening methods that are aimed at reducing their credit risk. DFIs in Eswatini 
that advance loans to economic agents (SMEs) are not only interested in the interest they 
receive on loans, but also the risks of such loans (Dlamini, 2016).    
 
DFIs have employed various screening means to identify potential borrowers who are more 




probability of repayment (Dlamini, 2016). DFIs in Eswatini have resorted to requiring 
collateral on loans to SMEs, reducing loan amounts being advanced to SMEs to reduce credit 
risk, reducing loan repayment periods to recover loan amounts promptly so as to avoid the 
prospects of default and increasing interest on loans advanced to SMEs as they are perceived 
to be high risk. It is for this reason that high-risk borrowers, faced with high IRs, reduced loan 
size, reduced loan repayment periods and collateral do not opt for loans from DFIs. The terms 
of loan contracts are thus designed by DFIs in a manner that induces borrowers to take actions 
in the interest of banks thereby attracting low risk borrowers only (Dlamini, 2016).  
 
As a result of these information asymmetry problems, a funding gap has been created whereby 
SMEs are unable to borrow all they want, or some loan applicants are unable to borrow at all 
thus not accessing credit lines which are crucial for their growth and for them to contribute 
meaningfully towards economic development in Eswatini (Zeng, 2014). 
2.6 Definition of and Classification of SMEs for the Study 
Businesses within the SME sector in the KoE are classified using the same set of criteria. 
Micro enterprises are those engaging up to three people, and employing capital less than E50, 
000 or earning a turnover of up to E60, 000 (FINCORP, 2017). The majority of micro 
enterprises fall under the informal sector. Small enterprises are mostly formalized businesses 
employing between 4 to 10 people or with capital investment from E50,000 to E2 million, and 
turnover of up to E3 million (Adisa et al., 2014). Medium enterprises employ between 11 and 
50 people or use capital investment from E2 million to E5 million and a turnover of over E3 
million to E8 million. A different classification is applied to micro-enterprises that are formal 
and engage in delivering professional services. Consultant, sales and marketing personnel, 
accountants and lawyers fall in this category. Individuals in these and other fields may operate 
as self-employed entrepreneurs (IFC, 2010). 
 
The directive defining the criteria for classifying SMEs provides that if there is an ambiguity 
as to the class an enterprise belongs to, the number of employees should be used as the 
deciding criterion. For example, a business with a turnover of E3.5 million but employing 
seven people will be defined a small rather than medium business. In addition, owner-operated 
independent SME is considered as substantially different from those of the SME subsidiary 
firm of a large organisation (Dlamini, 2018). Due to doubt pertaining to the accuracy of 




determine business size. These classifications are adopted throughout this study (FINCORP, 
2017).  Table 1 gives the definition of SMEs in KoE. 
 

















Employees 0 0 – 3 4 – 10 11 – 50 






Turnover <E60 000 <E60 000 < E3 million Up to 
E8 million 
 
MATURE: >10 years ESTABLISHED: 6 - 10 yrs    
GROWTH PHASE: 3 - 5 years START UP: 0 - 2 years 
Source: SME Policy (2009) Eswatini 
 
2.7 Importance of Financial Institutions in SME Development 
The financial services sector is expected to contribute greatly to realization of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) 2030 in the KoE (FINCORP, 2017). The DFIs are a very 
important source of funds for the operation, development and growth of SMEs in the Kingdom 
(Dong and Men, 2014). Most of the DFIs have been adopting innovative technology and the 
creation of tailor-made products in different sectors of the economy, most particularly, the 
SME sector in order to improve on the quality and variety of the loan portfolio (Malede, 2014). 
Most of the DFIs in the KoE have established separate units to specifically handle the needs 
of their SME customers, in acknowledgement of the inherent differences between SME 
customers and other corporate customers.   
 
The financial services sector is fragmented with different institutions using different lending 
technologies to serve clients, which resulted in funds not flowing from one segment of the 
financial system to the other. This resulted in the implementation of two major financial 
liberalisation programmes in the KoE for SMEs (Dlamini, 2017), the liberalisation of financial 




markets, removal of restrictions and the deregulation of interest rates. However, it had a 
minute effect on the conditions that inhibit DFIs from financing SMEs leaving their demand 
for credit unsatisfied. The CBE’s main objective is to restructure financially distressed DFIs, 
improve savings mobilization and enhance credit allocation especially to SMEs, enhance 
soundness in the banking sector by promoting competitive banking practices, develop money 
and capital markets and establish a special division for non-performing assets recovery trust 
(Sithole, 2017). 
 
In a study conducted by OECD (2014), it was established that financial liberalization leads to 
improvement in the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. The OECD stated 
that central governments must endeavour to ensure that businesses have access to institutional 
credits and deposit mobilisation. Unfortunately, a study by the United Nations (2017) reported 
that SMEs have rather been marginalised from the credit market after financial liberalisation 
and therefore they are still suffering from credit scarcity. 
 
The ADB Group (2011) argued that financial system plays a crucial role in development 
through the reduction of information and transactions cost and its efficiency in reducing those 
cost influences savings rates, investment decisions, technological innovation and long run 
growth rates. They stated that DFIs play a major role in promoting economic growth by 
ensuring the availability of cash flow cost credit to potential investors.  
 
The United Nations (2012) argued that in the early stages of economic development 
suppressed interest rates, credit policies and institution building provided the financial impetus 
necessary for economic development. It is in the interest of DFIs to ensure that the economy 
is growing efficiently by playing an intermediary role between suppliers and lenders of funds 
in any economy by gathering surplus funds in the economy and then lending these funds to 
those who need them. 
2.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter undertook a review of the literature in the area of this study, the credit rationing 
theory (concepts and definitions), adverse selection effects, forms of credit rationing, critiques 
of credit rationing, the empirical analysis of the constraints faced by SMEs in accessing credit, 
definition of SMEs and the characteristics of the SMEs, and finally importance of financial 
institutions to the development of SMEs. The synthesis of these aforementioned issues forms 




them to the situation of the same in Eswatini context. DFIs mainly apply this theory in 
handling credit demands of SMEs that compromises their relationships – while DFIs are there 
to foster development and growth of SMEs. Despite the application of this theory in Eswatini, 
the current government (through Ministry of Trade and Industry) advocates for universal 
access to DFI funding for all SMEs. However, SMEs are getting disproportionate access to 
DFI services in Eswatini, which is the concentration point of this study. Are there obstacles 
that Eswatini SMEs facing in accessing DFI services? Based on credit rationing concepts 
discussed in this chapter, selected credit-rationing factors were evaluated empirically (as 
discussed in section 2.4) affecting SMEs in Eswatini accessing loans through analysis 




























This chapter gives an insight into the methodology that was used in this research study which 
sought to examine the factors affecting SMEs’ access to lending from Eswatini DFIs. The 
methodology adopted for this study was determined by ‘appropriateness’ for the study. This 
is to ensure the gathering of reliable and relevant data and the application of appropriate 
statistical techniques in the data analysis so that potential statistical errors could be controlled; 
and valid conclusions arrived at (Sanders et al., 2016). This study employed the quantitative 
research techniques. This chapter provides an overview of the research design and approach, 
the target population, sampling methods and sampling techniques, the sample, data source, 
the definition and measurement of variables (including theoretical discussion linking each 
independent variable to the dependent variables) and the data analysis approaches and 
techniques used by this study. 
3.1 Research Design and approach 
This chapter describes the research methodology approach used to accomplish the aims of this 
study. A methodological research approach and design is a framework that binds research 
together so that the research questions can be analysed effectively (Edmunson and McManus, 
2007). Identification of research method is important because it makes the collection of data 
easier and gives a clear idea about the required information (Trochim and Donnelly, 2006). 
 
This study tested key factors of credit rationing affecting SMEs in gaining access to finance. 
To this end, a quantitative research method which followed the explanatory research design 
was applied in order to collect and analyse quantitative data on variables in order to establish 
the association or relationship between quantified variables (Saunders and Lewis, 2012; 
Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez, 2017). This is a retrospective study that takes a 
quantitative approach in observing the obstacles that Eswatini SMEs face when accessing 
financial services (loans) from Eswatini DFIs. Punch (2005) stated that quantitative research 
is typically directed at theory verification and related to numerical data. Creswell (2012: 13) 
stated that “in quantitative research, the investigator identifies a research problem based on 




was deemed appropriate to try and explain factors which impact on SMEs accessing DFI 
(loans). 
 
In listing some of the advantages of a quantitative research method, Martinez-Ferrero and 
Garcia-Sanchez (2017) highlighted the use of statistical methods in the analysis of data thus 
enabling the use of statistical inference procedures to generalize the findings from a sample 
to a defined population. In addition, Martinez-Ferrero and Garcia-Sanchez (2017:107) 
indicated that quantitative research “performs pervasive and controlled measurement, it is 
objective and observes linear relationships and the testing of hypothesis”. Through 
quantitative research, mathematical models were applied to predict the relationships that could 
establish, develop, strengthen and review the existing theory (Martínez-Ferrero and García-
Sánchez, 2017). 
 
The data used to conduct the empirical investigation were obtained from the database of CBE, 
which contains information of all those loans applicants (SMEs) and loan status – whether 
successful or not by DFIs. As a requirement all loan applicants through their applications, give 
out their business details ranging from name of institution, proprietor, gender, employment 
size, establishment period, type of business, amount required, repayment period, interest rates, 
collateral information, business place, etc. for the lending institutions to consider. The data 
contained in this database was ideal for this study as it contained information on key variables 
that can give a picture of what transpires in loan applications and meets special data needs for 
the review of access of SMEs to DFI loans. 
3.2 Sample and data source 
One of the most indispensable aspects of a study is data collection, since it essentially 
contributes to the overall assembling of information to address the research question (Babbie, 
2015). It is however essential that the method used in obtaining the data be executed with 
sound judgement and the application of appropriate research principles (Ary et al., 2014). 
According to Creswell (2013), quantitative research collects data on predetermined 
instruments that yield statistical data.  
 
The study used secondary data because it allows testing of correlation of the chosen variables 
and was compiled from reviews of data published by the CBE on loans issued to SMEs by 
DFIs. Abma and Stake (2014) stated that due to the adequacy of secondary data there is no 




this research used secondary data of all 1, 390 loan applicants in 2018 from CBE database to 
measure the extent to which SMEs find it difficult to access loans in Eswatini and eventually 
test the hypothesis that SMEs in Eswatini do not face barriers to access to DFI lending. 
3.3 Analytical approach and variables used 
The data analysis involved the use of both descriptive and inferential statistics. Simple 
descriptive statistics were used in order to have a summary description of the variables used 
in the analysis. This involved the use of percentages, means, frequency distributions and 
standard deviations to describe the socio-economic characteristic parameters and institutional 
factors but also compare within and between impacts of loan application on those who 
accessed loans and those who failed to access. Besides descriptive statistics, inferential 
statistics were used to determine the covariates of the likelihood of having a loan from DFI. 
In this study, the success of SME loan applicant to access a loan was measured by a loan 
application status (LAS), which is a dichotomous variable. This variable was then used as a 
dependent variable (𝑌𝑖𝑗) that was analysed to find out if there were any other independent 
variables (SME age, gender of SME owner, SME location, SME collaterals, interest rates, 
loan amounts and loan terms) that were associated with its behaviour. Loan access and non-
access were analysed using the following general (Equation 1) formula. Multiple logistic 
regression model characterizing LAS by the SMEs was specified as: If  yLAS 𝑖 is the loan 
application status for the 𝑖th  SME (where i = 1 for successful application and i = 0 for 
unsuccessful application), then the models would be specified as: 
  
𝑦𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘;       (1) 
 
where β0 is a constant, β1 + ⋯ + βk are coefficients (or weights) attached to covariates and 
X1 + ⋯ + Xk are covariates (independent variables – categorical/continuous). Table 2 gives 










Table 2: Variables in the model 
Variable Description  
Age Age of SME since establishment in years 
Gender  Gender of SME owner (1 for male and 2 for female) 
LAS 
 
Loan Application Status; 1 if SME accessed loan and 0 if SME did not 
access loan 
Location Residential area of SME; 1 if urban, 0 Otherwise 




Loan Repayment Period in months 
 
Collateral for SME in Emalangeni 
IR Interest Rate per months 
Source: Author 
 
The above analytical approach was adopted in conjunction with the quantitative research 
approach taking into account seven independent variables (refer to Table 2) namely loan 
amount, age of SME, location, gender of the owner, loan term, collateral offered and interest 
rate to investigate the extent to which these factors affect SMEs’ access to DFI lending, whose 
proxy was LAS – the dependent variable. 
 
Secondary data used in this dissertation were extracted and given in 2013 Microsoft Excel 
Package format by the CBE after formal request. The data were then transferred to SPSS 
(version 24) statistical package for summarisation and further analyses. The SPSS graphical 
user interface supports a variety of data preparation, statistical analysis and predictive 
modeling algorithms. Also, its menu driven usability makes it easy for any user unlike other 
packages that are based on manual writing of analysis codes.  
3.4 Analysing the factors impacting SMEs’ access to debt finance in Eswatini 
Regression analysis is a collective name for methods that can be used for the modelling and 
analysis of numerical data consisting of values of a dependent variable (also called a response 




variables or predictors). The dependent variable in the regression equation is modelled as a 
function of the independent variables, corresponding parameters (constants) and an error term. 
Regression is used for hypothesis testing, and it is also referred to as modelling of linear 
relationships (Pallant, 2010). The use of regression analysis relies heavily on the underlying 
assumptions being satisfied. 
 
For this study, a model that reflects the observed status of the SMEs access to loans was 
required. Such observations reflect a binary variable; i.e. accessing a loan or not. Since 
dichotomous variables cause analytical problems as they do not give a linear relationship 
between dependent and independent variables and linear probability models estimated by 
ordinary least squares are thus not applicable. Instead, the logit model was applied. According 
to Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998:311), “the use of probit and logit models, that give maximum 
likelihood estimates overcome most of the analytical problems associated with linear 
probability models and provide parameter estimates which are asymptotically consistent, 
efficient and Gaussian so that the analogue of the regression t-test can be applied”.   
 
Logistic regression models are popular statistical techniques in which the probability of a 
binary outcome (such as accessing loan or not accessing loan) is related to a set of explanatory 
variables that are hypothesised to influence the outcome (Neupane et al., 2002). The adoption 
of this model was so as it is extremely flexible and widely used function and lends itself to 
meaningful interpretations when the dependent variable is dichotomous. Therefore, logistic 
regression model is computationally easier to use than the ordinary least squares regression 
analysis. 
 
In addressing the research question that “How do credit-rationing factors such as collateral, 
interest rates, location, age of SMEs, loan term, gender of SME owner and loan amounts- 
influence SMEs’ access to DFI loans in Eswatini”, Equation 3 was used where the null 
hypothesis was: 
H0: β1=β2=…=βk=0 (All coefficients are not significantly different from zero, meaning that 
all variables have no influence as determinants of loan acquisition) versus the alternative 
hypothesis that: 
H1: β1≠β2≠…≠βk≠0 (All coefficients are significantly different from zero, meaning that either 





For specific hypotheses, the following null hypotheses were formulated: 
H01: β1=0 (the collateral coefficient is not significantly different from zero, meaning that 
it has no influence as a determinant of loan acquisition) 
H02: β2=0 (the interest rate coefficient is not significantly different from zero, meaning that 
it has no influence as a determinant of loan acquisition) 
H03: β3=0 (the loan amount coefficient is not significantly different from zero, meaning 
that it has no influence as a determinant of loan acquisition) 
H04: β4=0 (the age of SME coefficient is not significantly different from zero, meaning that 
it has no influence as a determinant of loan acquisition) 
H05: β5=0 (the location coefficient is not significantly different from zero meaning that it 
has no influence as a determinant of loan acquisition) 
H06: β6=0 (the gender of SME owner coefficient is not significantly different from zero 
meaning that it has no influence as a determinant of loan acquisition) 
H07: β7=0 (the Loan term coefficient is not significantly different from zero, meaning that 
it has no influence as a determinant of loan acquisition) 
 
All these hypotheses were assessed using their respective coefficients and associated p-values 
with those p-values less than 0.05 implying that they are significantly different from zero and 
those with p-values above 0.05 implying that they are not significantly different from zero. If 
the results were not significantly different from zero, then that variable is of no significant 
importance in determining loan access in Eswatini. 
 
Following Gujurati (1999), the logistic regression model characterising LAS by SMEs is 
specified as: If 𝑦𝑖 is the fact that the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ SME accessed DFI loan service and 1-𝑦𝑖 be the 
contrary fact that the 𝑖𝑡ℎ SME did not accessed DFI loan service. The dependent variable is 
the natural log of the probability of accessing a DFI loan (P) divided by the probability of not 
accessing a DFI loan (1-P). If   the probability of 𝑦𝑖, P(𝑦𝑖=1) = 𝜋𝑖 and P(1-𝑦𝑖=0) = 1-𝜋𝑖, then; 
the Logistic Regression Model is given as: 
 






= 𝑢 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘   (2) 
 
where  




𝛽0 = constant (the log odds of SME accessing loans without any effect from the covariates), 
𝛽1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘 = coefficients (or weights) attached to covariates and 𝑋1 + ⋯ + 𝑋𝑘 = covariates 
as explained in Table 2. 
 
It should be noted that the estimated coefficients do not directly indicate the effect of change 
in the corresponding explanatory variables on probability (P) of the outcome occurring. The 
coefficients rather reflect the effect of individual explanatory variables on its log {ln[P/(1-
P)]}. The positive coefficient means that the log odds increase as the corresponding 
independent variable increases (Neupane et al., 2002). The coefficients in the logistic 
regression are estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation method. In this study, the 
test statistic used was the Wald test (also called the Wald Chi-Squared Test), to assess if an 
explanatory variable in the model are significant. “Significant” means that they add value to 
the model; variables that add no value can be deleted without affecting the model in any 
meaningful way. 
3.5 Statistical Assumptions of Logistic Regression 
Regression analysis is affected by the characteristics and distribution of variables involved. 
Therefore, there is a need to minimise these effects for the plausibility of the outcomes of the 
modelling. There are numerous statistical tests to determine if the assumption of the logistic 
regression analysis is satisfied. Some of the characteristics that can affect the outcomes are 
discussed below. 
 
Outliers: these are defined as observations that are statistically different from the other 
observations. According to Hair et al., (2006), outliers were also identified in this study and 
considered as missing to reduce the effects of their influence on the analysis. 
 
Multicollinearity: It is defined as the extent to which a variable can be explained by other 
variables in the analysis (Hair et al., 1998). The magnitude of multicollinearity was analysed 
by considering the size of variance inflation factor (VIF). VIF quantifies how much the 
variance is inflated. As the interpretation of the results of the regression analysis is based on 
estimated coefficients, these coefficients are affected by variances; hence, the existence of 
multicolinearity inflates the coefficients. A rule of thumb is that a VIF of equal or greater than 





The model validation was accessed through the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic and R-Squared 
while model adequacy was checked through the predicted percentage correct and deviation 
obtained when estimating the selected model.   
 
Correlational analysis: In probability theory and statistics, correlation (often measured in 
terms of a correlation coefficient) indicates the strength and direction of a linear relationship 
between two random variables (Pallant, 2010). Correlation analysis was conducted among the 
variables to provide insight into possible relationships among variables. Because of the 
conventional dictum that correlation does not imply causation, these correlations cannot be 
validly used to infer causal relationship between the variables (Pallant, 2010). Pearson 
correlation coefficient (with three possible outcomes – a negative value showing negative 
relationship, a positive value showing a positive relationship and a ‘no relationship’ outcome 
depicted by a zero (0) value) was used to test the association between the variables and the 
chi-square test to establish the level of significance of the association. Having established the 
presence of correlation, regression analysis, was done to determine the influence of the 
predictor variables on the endogenous variables. 
 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the research methodology for this study. This was a retrospective study 
and used the explanatory research design which was purely quantitative. The population for 
this study and the sample of this study was identified. The data for this study was collected 
from secondary sources.  The data for this study was then analysed using SPSS version 24.0 
and the descriptive statistics, correlational analysis, and logistic regression analysis were used 
to assess the strengths between the variables of this study, namely the independent variables 
(age of SME, business type, loan amount, collateral on loan, interest on loan and SME 
location) and the dependent variable (access to DFI loans). The next chapter presents the 





DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of data analysis and their discussions with regards to the 
objective of the study, which was to examine the factors affecting SMEs’ access to loans 
from Eswatini DFIs and what could possibly be done to enhance a better efficiency of the 
financial intermediation process, regarding the ratio of capital that is directed to the SMEs. 
Using a database of loan applicants from CBE as a data source, a quantitative research 
approach was adopted using both descriptive and inferential statistics. The data were 
analysed and results of this are given and discussed in this chapter.  
4.1 Descriptive statistical analysis of explanatory variables 
The dataset comprised 1,390 loan applicants (SMEs) including both successful and 
unsuccessful applicants. There were many variables for each of the applicants in the 
database, however, for this study, only those that were necessary to achieve the objective of 
the study were extracted and Table 3 gives the summary of variables (categorical/discrete) 


















Table 3: Description of discrete variables used in the analysis 
Variable Categories Number Percent 
Gender of Owner of SME 
  
 
Male 695 50 
 
Female 695 50 
 
Total 1390 100 
Location of SME 
   
 
Rural 583 42 
 
Urban 807 58 
 
Total 1390 100 
Loan Status 
   
 
Loan Not Accessed 916 66 
 
Loan Accessed 474 34 
  Total 1390 100 
             Source: Author 
 
Table 3 shows that there were 1,390 loan applicants (SMEs), who had both categorical 
(discrete) and continuous variables. Of interest among the categorical variables were those 
given in Table 3. The composition of applicants by gender of owner of the SMEs shows 
that there was equal representation (50 percent for each gender) in the list of applicants. On 
geographical location of the SMEs, the distribution shows that 583 (42 percent) were in 
rural areas while 807 (58 percent) were in urban areas. 
 
Application for a loan was one thing and getting it was a different thing altogether. This is 
where loan applicants know their fate in the economic muscle of their business. Table 3 
shows that among 1,390 applicants, 916 (66 percent) did not access loans while 474 (34 
percent) accessed loans. Table 4 gives the description of continuous variables that were in 









Table 4: Description of continuous variables used in the analysis 
Variable Number Minimum Maximum Mean 
Interest Rates (%) 1,390 4 15 12 
Age of SME (Years) 1,390 1 56 16 
Loan Amounts Applied (Emalangeni) 1,390 10,000 24,102,407 344,245 
Repayment Period (Months) 1,390 1 160 22 
Collateral (Emalangeni) 1,390 15, 000 3,615,361 196,475 
Source: Author 
 
Table 4 gives the description of continuous independent variables to appreciate the 
variations of the SMEs in terms of how old they are, interest rates preferred, loan amounts 
applied for, preferred repayment periods and collateral offered. On interest rates, SMEs 
were given interest rates ranging from 4 to 15 percent with a mean of 12 percent. Table 4 
shows their existing period (ages) since establishment. According to Table 4, there were 
some that were only a year-old while others were 56 years old with a mean existence of 16 
years. The values of loan amounts applied for ranged from as low as 10, 000 to 24 million 
Emalangeni, with a mean loan of around 300,000 Emalangeni. On repayment period, Table 
4 shows that some loan applicants agreed to a repayment period of one month, while others 
preferred to repay in 160 months with a mean repayment period of 22 months. Collateral 
that these applicants offered as shown by Table 4, ranged from 15 thousand to 3 million 
Emalangeni with a mean of around 196 thousand Emalangeni. 
 
The study further isolated those who were denied access to loans and found out the 
distribution of some of the variables. Specifically, the study wanted to establish the gender 
of the owners, their location, their collaterals, their interest rates and repayment periods to 
ascertain the reasons behind the rejection of their applications.  
 
On rejection by gender, Figure 5 shows a frequency tabulation that there was an equal 
rejection distribution across gender meaning that there was no gender bias in deciding on 
whom to reject. This outcome is in tandem with Aterido et al. (2013), who found out that 
the gender of the owner of the SME does not significantly influence access to DFI loans. 
Aterido’s study used data from African countries which documented similar results, which 










On rejection by location, the results as shown by Figure 6 shows that most (535/916 = 58 
percent) of rejected SMEs were in urban while 381out of 916 (around 42 percent) were in 
rural areas. 
 
 Figure 6: Distribution of rejection of SMEs by location 
 
 
 Source: Author 
 
 
The distribution of the rejected SMEs was also described further by their existence periods 






























Figure 7: Distribution of rejected SMEs by their existence period 
 
 Source: Author 
 
 
Most of the rejected SMEs (543/916 = 59 percent) ranged from a month to 12 months of 
existence i.e. were in their early stage and 373 (about 41 percent) were established over a 
year prior to loan application.  
 
Another issue that was investigated, for those that did not access loans, was how much they 
were looking for in terms of loan to economically improve their business in reference to 
how much collateral they offered. Figure 8 gives the distribution of categorised loan 
amounts applied for by SMEs. As it is presented in Figure 8, the majority (about 30 percent) 
applied for small amounts of below 10, 000 Emalangeni with only about 14 percent that 
wanted loans above 500,000 Emalangeni.  
 
Figure 8: Percent distribution of Loan Amounts by categories 
 
Source: Author 
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On collaterals given by applicants, Figure 9 summarises the percentage distribution of the 
monetary value of collateral committed for the loan applications. 
 




Figure 9 shows that there were many loan applicants that committed collateral below          
10, 000 Emalangeni, with only 1 percent that gave collaterals of over 500, 000 Emalangeni. 
On the distribution of categorised collateral and loan amounts, Table 5 gives the distribution 
of categorised loan amounts and collaterals of loan applicants to give a picture of loan 
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Table 5: Bivariate distribution of categorised collaterals and loan amounts of 
applicants 
    
Categorized Collaterals 
  



































Below 10,000 419 0 0 0 0 419 
Between 10,000 
and 50, 000 309 8 3 0 0 320 
Between 50,001 
and 100, 000 50 65 5 0 0 120 
Between 100,001 
and 500, 000 0 276 55 0 0 331 
Over 500,000 0 0 43 135 22 200 
  Total 778 349 106 135 22 1,390 
Source: Author 
 
Table 5 shows that of 1,390 loan applicants, 419 of 1,390 (about 30 percent) had both loan 
amounts and collaterals below 10, 000 Emalangeni with only 22 out of 1,390 (about 2 
percent) that had both loan amounts and collaterals above 500,000 Emalangeni. Figure 7 
and 8 in conjunction with Table 5 point to the fact that most applicants applied for loans 
that they could not afford. 
 
4.2 Relationships between credit-rationing factors that affect SMEs in accessing
 DFI loans in Eswatini – Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis is one of the variable assessment tools used to test any association 
between used independent variables. This was done to assess the influence they might have 
in the model in determining the outcome of loan access.  Table 6 gives the correlation 








Table 6: Correlation Analysis of socio-economic factors that affect SMEs’ access 














Age of SME 1.000       
Gender of 
owner 
0.005 1.000     
 
Loan Amount -0.028 -0.001 1.000     
Interest Rate 0.044 -0.017 -0.178 1.000    
Loan Terms -0.018 0.053 -0.233 -0.122 1.000   
Location -0.004 0.025 -0.057 0.045 0.058 1.000  
Collateral 0.023 0.010 0.076 0.186 0.242 -0.042 1.000 
Source: Author 
 
The results in Table 6 show that there is an association between all variables with the 
direction (the signs of correlation coefficients) and strength (the actual values of the 
correlation coefficients) of the linear association using Pearson Correlation Coefficient. 
This means that the chosen variables were in the same family of characteristics of SMEs 
and are related to some extent but not strong. There were negative associations between 
some of the variables like age of SME and loan amounts applied (-0.028), loan terms (-
0.018) and location (-0.004). Gender of owner of SME and loan amounts applied (-0.001) 
and interest rates (-0.017) were also negatively associated. Loan amounts and interest rates 
(-0.178), loan terms (-0.233), age of SME (-0.057) and location (-0.004) were also 
negatively associated.  Interest rate was negatively associated with loan terms (-0.122). 
Location was negatively associated with collateral (-0.042). The negative direction as given 
by the sign means that a one variable changes in magnitude (increases), the other one 
decreases (changes the opposite direction) while those with positive sign means that as one 
increases (changes in magnitude) so does the other.  
 
There were other variables that were positively correlated (when one variable increases in 
magnitude so does the other) such as age of SME and gender of owner (0.005), interest rate 
(0.044) and collateral (0.023). Gender of owner of SME was positively associated with loan 




with loan amounts (0.076). Loan terms was positively correlated with location (0.045) – 
when and collateral (0.186). Loan amount was positively correlated with collateral (0.058) 
– when SMEs collateral increases so does the loan amounts demand.  
 
The lowest correlation is -0.001, which was between loan amounts and gender of applicant 
while the highest was between repayment terms and collateral with a correlation coefficient 
of 0.242. However, according to Tabachnik and Fidell (2007), there is no evidence on 
multicolinearity as all values are less than 0.70, which is the threshold for multicolinearity. 
For this reason, using these variables does not bring any problem on the modelling outcome.  
4.3 Factors associated with loan access by SMEs – Logistic regression 
The primary objective of the study was to examine the impact of credit-rationing factors in 
SMEs accessing loan in Eswatini. Binary logistic regression analysis was performed that 
resulted in the output reproduced (with coefficients, Wald test statistics, p-values and Odds 
Ratios as the basis of examination of the impact of each of the variables used). Table 7 gives 
the results of logistic regression analysis that was done using the aforementioned variables. 
 
Table 7: Logistic regression analysis of factors associated with financial services 
access by SMEs in Eswatini 
Variables Coefficients Wald p-values 
Odds Ratios (Exp. 
(Coefficients)) 
Age of SME -0.012 7.770 0.005 0.988 
Gender(male) 0.003 0.001 0.977 1.003 
Loan Amounts 0.001 4.857 0.028 1.045 
Interest Rates 0.014 0.300 0.584 1.014 
Loan Terms -0.004 2.493 0.114 0.996 
Location (Urban) 0.026 0.049 0.825 1.026 
Collateral 0.002 4.341 0.071 1.002 
Constant -0.597 3.417 0.065 0.551 
Pseudo R-Squared Cox & Snell  0.420   
  Nagelkerke 0.510   
Hosmer & Lemeshow Test  18.3   
Classification Table 66.2   






All seven (7) variables as given in Table 3 were included in the model and their 
corresponding parameters and test statistics given as well. Table 7 shows the results of 
estimation of the logistic model of loan applicants in two segments: the first containing the 
coefficients (which are then exponentiated to give odds ratios), the Wald values and factor 
change – odds ratios with their associated p-values. The magnitude of the odds ratios is 
classified into three: 1) those below 1, 2) those that are equal to 1and 3) and those above 1.  
 
If the log odds are greater than 1, then the probability of a loan applicant accessing a loan 
is increased by that value minus 1, likewise the probability decreases by 1 minus that value. 
In this case, if the log odd is less than 1, then the loan applicants do not access a loan. The 
probability of being in either group is made based on the predictor variables. In logistic 
regression, the interpretation of coefficients is that it gives change in the log odds of the 
outcome for a one-unit increase in the predictor variable.  
 
The coefficients given in Table 7 were also used to test the specific null hypothesis (as 
presented in section 3.4) for the variables to determine their respective effects in the SMEs’ 
ability to access DFI services. The respective p-values were used as an evidence to reject or 
fail to reject the null hypotheses. Note that all those variables whose p-values are less than 
0.05, affected the outcome of loan application while those with p-values of more than 0.05 
have minimal or no impact at all. Apart from variable coefficients there is a constant, which 
is the intercept, shows that when all variables are zero, the coefficient for loan application 
status is -0.597, a Wald test of 3.417 and a p-value of 0.065. with the corresponding log 
odds (odds ratio) of 0.551, (which is less than 1) meaning that without submitting any 
additional important information, SMEs cannot access any loan – i.e. there is less likelihood 
that SMEs that does not submit any additional information to be granted a loan compared 
to those SMEs that submit important information. For each of the variables, below is the 
interpretation of their respective values. 
 
Impact of age of SME on loan acquisition 
Age of SME had a coefficient of -0.012, Wald value of 7.770 and a p-values of 0.005. Since 




coefficient of age of SME is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, we conclude 
that was one of the variables that determined loan application status.   
 
Impact of gender of SME owner on loan acquisition 
Gender had a coefficient of 0.003, Wald value of 0.001 and a p-values of 0.977. Since the 
p-values is greater than decision criteria of 0.05, we fail to reject the hypothesis (H06) that 
the coefficient of gender is not significantly different from zero.  Hence, we conclude that 
gender of owner of SME did not have any impact on loan application status. 
 
Impact of loan amounts on loan acquisition 
Loan amounts had a coefficient of 0.001, Wald value of 4.857 and a p-values of 0.028. 
Since the p-values is less than decision criteria of 0.05, we reject the hypothesis (H03) that 
the coefficient of loan amount is not significantly different from zero: hence, the conclusion 
that loan amount was one of the variables that determined loan application status. 
 
Impact of interest rate on loan acquisition 
Interest rate had a coefficient of 0.014, Wald value of 0.300 and a p-values of 0.584. Since 
the p-values is greater than decision criteria of 0.05, we fail to reject the hypothesis (H02) 
that the coefficient of interest rate is not significantly different from zero. Hence, we 
conclude that interest rate did not have any impact on loan application status.  
 
Impact of loan term on loan acquisition 
Loan term had a coefficient of -0.004, Wald value of 2.413 and a p-values of 0.114. Since 
the p-values is greater than decision criteria of 0.05, we fail to reject the hypothesis (H07) 
that the coefficient of loan term is not significantly different from zero. Hence, we conclude 
that loan term did not have any impact on loan application status.  
 
Impact of location on loan acquisition 
Location had a coefficient of 0.026, Wald value of 0.049 and a p-values of 0.825 as shown 
in Table 7. Since the p-values is greater than decision criteria of 0.05, we fail to reject the 
hypothesis (H05) that the coefficient of location is not significantly different from zero. 





Impact of collateral on loan acquisition 
Collateral had a coefficient of 0.002, Wald value of 4.341 and a p-values of 0.071 as shown 
in Table 7. Since the p-values is greater than decision criteria of 0.05, we fail to reject the 
hypothesis (H01) that the coefficient of collateral is not significantly different from zero. 
Hence, we conclude that collateral did not have any impact on loan application status.  
 
From the result above, Age of the business and loan amount applied were found to be 
statistically significant affecting loan acquisition in Eswatini. For younger SMEs in age, the 
log odds of getting loan (versus not getting a loan) decreases by about 99 points, when all 
other factors are not considered, while for one-unit change in loan amount applied by SMEs, 
the odds of getting a loan (versus not getting a loan) increases by about 5 points when other 
necessary variables are not considered. The predicted model for accessing a loan in DFIs in 
Eswatini is given as: 
 
𝑢 = −0.597 − 0.012𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 0.003𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 + 0.001𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
+ 0.014𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 − 0.004𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 + 0.026𝑆𝑀𝐸 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 0.002𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 
 
The other five variables namely: gender of owner, interest rate, repayment term, location 
and collateral, which had their respective p-values above 0.05, were not significant 
predictors of access to loans in Eswatini. It means that they are not considered by DFIs as 
value information for one to access their loans.  
 
As for gender, as also depicted by Figure 5, t there was no gender discrimination in 
accessing loans in Eswatini, which could mean that its validity as a factor for loan access is 
defeated. Interest rates are fixed by DFIs and applicants do not have any choice. This can 
also explain the reason for its insignificance in the model. Loan terms are mainly 
predetermined by DFIs such that applicants do not have a liberty to choose, hence this could 
be one of the reasons for its insignificance. Location of business entity was also insignificant 
for loan access. Most applicants were in urban areas and that did not persuade DFIs to grant 
them loans. Collateral was also insignificant, and it may be due to the fact that most of them 
declared very little or no collateral at all. This points to the full application of credit rationing 





The second part of the table gives the overall model information that summarises the 
goodness of fit (GoF) of the model. On the overall, the model has an explanatory power of 
somewhere between 42 (forty-two) (Cox and Snell R Squared) and 51(fifty-one) percent 
(Nagelkerke R Squared) of the variance of probability of accessing a loan. This means that 
loan applicants (SMEs) have little or no chance of accessing a loan to cushion their weak 
economic muscles for business development and growth if they depend on the submitted 
information only. There is other information that DFIs look for from SMEs in Eswatini for 
them to access their services. The only remaining source of hope for SMEs to survive 
economic pressure could be outside DFIs that can include friends, relatives and other well-
wishers. Despite thin model explanatory power, it is well formulated and valid as far as 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistics of 18.3 are concerned. Classification table of all variables 
was 66.2, which is way above 50 percent. These two parameters give the overall proof that 
this was the correct model for variables used in the analysis. 
4.4 Impact of credit rationing in Eswatini 
The second objective of the study was to analyse if credit rationing affects the development 
and growth of SMEs in Eswatini. This was done by assessing the impact of each of the 
seven factors individually through their respective coefficients and p-values. The outcome 
as presented in Table 7 and discussed in sections 4.3 shows that there is a strong evidence 
that credit rationing is being applied by DFIs through age of SMEs and loan amounts and 
has an impact in Eswatini, such that SMEs are failing to access DFI services despite giving 
some of the required information during loan application process. DFIs were willingly not 
allowing SMEs to access funds to boost their economic power, even if the latter are willing 
to pay higher interest rates. DFIs in Eswatini that advance loans to economic agents (SMEs) 
are not only interested in the interest they receive on loans, but also the risks of such loans 
(Dlamini, 2016). The analysis in this study as shown by the output of the logistic model in 
Table 7 points to the fact that SMEs in Eswatini are feeling the economic heat from DFIs. 
The significance of the two (2) used socio-economic factors (variables), namely, age of 
SMEs and loan amounts is the undisputable evidence that DFIs in Eswatini are applying 
credit rationing in their loan processing. 
4.5 Discussion of the results 
Despite the government’s strong emphasis in its National Policy on SMEs that for Eswatini 




need to increase entrepreneurial activity in the country through enhancement of the 
environment in which businesses are set up, established and endeavour to grow needs to be 
conducive to enterprise. To this end they stressed on increased effort to channel funds to 
businesses from DFIs, private sources and from the commercial banking sector. There are 
still some SMEs that are struggling to survive through inability to access financial assistance 
15 years after the launch of the policy. The purpose of this study was to assess factors 
associated with loan acquisition in Eswatini using a secondary dataset of 1,390 loan 
applicants that was obtained from the CBE. The analysis was preceded by summarizing the 
applicants’ characteristics such as gender of the applicants, location of the business, loan 
status, interest rates, age of SME, loan terms, loan amounts applied, and collateral.  
 
The analysis of these characteristics shows that these SMEs have mixed and varied 
characteristics which makes the use of this dataset very suitable for this analysis.  On gender 
of owners of these SMEs, the analysis showed that both genders were equally denied access 
to loans as there was 50-50 percent rejection of applicants. This is encouraging as no gender 
had an upper hand in accessing loans as well as seeking financial help. On geographical 
location of the SMEs, the distribution shows that 583 (42 percent) were in rural areas while 
807 (58 percent) were in urban areas.  
 
When one applies for a loan it does not mean the end of the process and that you will get it. 
There are two possible outcomes in the application; access a loan or not. The analysis of 
this dataset shows that among 1,390 applicants, 916 (66 percent) did not access loans while 
474 (34 percent) were the only successful applicants. This was against the Ministry of 
Commerce, Trade and Industry National Policy of the KoE on the development of SMEs, 
which was launched in 2003 (KoE, 2003). The policy clearly stated that “All Swazis who 
request financial assistance from microfinance institutions should have access to support in 
setting up a business”. This was another pointer to the application of credit rationing in 
Eswatini. According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), credit rationing occurs when some 
borrowers receive nothing or less than the amount of credit applied for at prevailing market 
rates. 
 
On interest rates, the analysis shows that DFIs offered loan interest rates ranging from 4 to 




the results show that there were some that were only a year old while others were 56 years 
old with a mean existence of 16 years. Loan amounts applied ranged from as low as 10, 000 
to 24 million Emalangeni, with a mean loan of around 340,000 Emalangeni. On repayment 
period, the analysis shows that some applicants preferred a repayment period of 1 month 
while others wanted to repay in 160 months with a mean repayment period of 22 months. 
Collateral that these applicants offered as a result of the analysis, ranged from 15 thousand 
to 3 million Emalangeni with a mean of around 196 thousand Emalangeni. 
 
The study further isolated those who were denied loans and found out the distribution of 
some of the variables. Specifically, the study wanted to establish the gender of the owners, 
their business types, their location, their collaterals, their interest rates and repayment 
periods to ascertain the reasons behind the rejection of their applications.  
 
Rejection by age of SMEs shows that most of rejected SMEs (543/916 = 59 percent) ranged 
from a month to 12 months of their existence i.e. were in their early stage and 393 (about 
41 percent) were established over a year prior to loan application. How much were they 
looking for in terms of loan to boost their business in reference to how much collateral they 
offered was another issue looked into mainly for those that did not access loans. On paper, 
SME ownership by gender were treated equally for all applicants and this gave equal 
platform for applicants – no favouring of SMEs in any form as evidenced by rejection and 
acceptance of their applications. 
 
Location as a factor of loan access is argued by Martin and Sunley (2015) as a positive 
factor that favours loan access, as those located in urban areas tend to create good 
relationship with financial institutions. However, this does not work like that as in this study 
most (58 percent) of SMEs were in urban that could give them an added advantage, but they 
were rejected due to other factors. It is important to note that theory does not suggest that 
all firms that seek credit should be able to access it. Some proponents suggest that any 
evidence that firms are unable to get finance is a market failure. However, this is not true. 
According to Brown and Lee (2017), the theory around market failures does not suggest 
that all firms should get capital, merely that there may be situations where firms which 





There is undeniable fact that worldwide perspective access to finance has resonated in most 
studies as a critical area that is the Achilles heel of SMEs across a range of sectors. 
According to Barbero et al., (2011), the inability of SMEs to gain access to adequate finance 
has long been considered a critical barrier to growth with some scholars such as Kerr and 
Nanda (2009) agreeing that entrepreneurial finance is the biggest hurdle for start-ups and 
newly established businesses. Available literature also suggests that if a firm does not hold 
sufficient financial capital, it will be negatively affected in its growth and overall 
performance given the fact that sufficient resources help entrepreneurs to undertake bold 
entrepreneurial ventures that can facilitate growth (Bamford et al., 2000). It is for this reason 
that the evaluation of factors impacting SMEs access to finances would be necessary for 
their survival in this competitive business environment due to liquidity constraints.  
 
An empirical analysis of this through the application of a binary logistic model was done to 
assess factors that Eswatini SMEs are exposed to that impact their access to financial 
assistance from DFIs. The entry point of the analysis was the correlation analysis of the 
variables used to check the existence of multicollinearity – relationships and their 
magnitude in terms of both strength and direction, which affects the output.     
 
The results of correlation analysis show that some variables used were negatively associated 
like age of SME and loan amounts applied, interest rates, loan terms and location. Gender 
of owner of SME and loan amounts applied, interest rates were also negatively associated. 
Loan amounts and interest rates were also negatively associated. This means that as one 
variable increases in magnitude, then the other decreases or the behaviour of one of variable 
is negatively affected by the existence of the other. The lowest correlation is -0.001between 
loan amounts and gender of applicant meaning that these two variables are related in a 
negative manner. However, according to Tabachnik and Fidell (2007), the overall 
correlation output shows no evidence on multicolinearity as all values are less than 0.90 a 
value that is associated with a very strong relationship that affects regression analysis. It is 
for this reason that using these variables has no implication on the modelling. 
 
The output of binary logistic regression analysis shows the results of estimation of the 
logistic model of loan applicants with the Wald values and factor change – odds ratios with 




institutions in Eswatini the only determining factors are age of their businesses and loan 
amount applied. So, from the result above, only age of the business and loan amount applied 
for are found to be statistically significant in affecting loan acquisition in Eswatini. For 
younger SMEs in age, the log odds of getting a loan (versus not getting a loan) decreases 
by a single point when other factors are not considered. While for one-unit change in loan 
amount applied by SMEs, the odds of getting a loan (versus not getting a loan) decreases 
by about 5 points when other necessary variables are not considered.  
 
As it should be the case that not every SME that applied for a loan can get it, which has 
been witnessed with this analysis. It is also acknowledged elsewhere by OECD (2012) in 
their studies conducted among European countries that as much as we need to prove the 
importance of access to finance, it should be acknowledged that access to finance remains 
a problem to most SMEs. There should be an alternative means of funding.  In his studies 
conducted within the American context, Li (2002:1816) highlighted that capital markets do 
not provide adequate funds for young or newly established businesses.  
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, research by Biggs and Shah (2006) suggested that access to 
entrepreneurial finances is largely bi-modal with larger SMEs having open and easy access 
to finance than small enterprises. The authors in their writing (2006:3046) suggested that 
the reason for this is that financial markets are underdeveloped thereby giving limited access 
to finances and the opportunity cost to capital is high. With these ideas, it would be accurate 
to accept as widespread that access to finance is problematic for small businesses.        
 
Overall, the model has the explanatory power of somewhere between 42 (Cox and Snell R 
Squared) and 51 percent (Nagelkerke R Squared) of the variance of probability of accessing 
a loan. This means that loan applicants (SMEs) have little or no chance of acquiring a loan 
to cushion their weak economic muscles for business growth by only depending on the 
submitted information. The other alternative source of hope could be outside DFIs that can 
include friends, relatives and other well-wishers.  
 
Credit rationing, an action taken by lending institutions to limit or deny access to credit 
based on borrower’s worthiness mainly due to lender imposed has both worked and not 




access to finance has resonated in most studies as a critical area that is the Achilles heel of 
SMEs across a range of sectors. According to Barbero et al, (2011), the inability of SMEs 
to gain access to adequate finance has long been considered a critical barrier to growth with 
some scholars such as Kerr and Nanda (2009) agreeing that entrepreneurial finance is the 
biggest huddle for start-ups and newly established businesses. Available literature also 
suggests that if a firm does not hold sufficient financial capital, it will be negatively affected 
in its growth and overall performance given the fact that sufficient resources help 
entrepreneurs to undertake bold entrepreneurial ventures that can facilitate growth 
(Bamford et al., 2000). It is for this reason that the evaluation of factors hindering SMEs 
access to finances would be necessary for their survival in this competitive business 
environment due to liquidity constraints. An empirical analysis of this through the 
application of a binary logistic model was done to assess factors that Eswatini SMEs are 
exposed to that hinder their access to financial assistance from existing DFIs. The entry 
point of the analysis was the correlation analysis of the variables to be used to check the 
existence of multicollinearity, which affects the outputs.     
 
The results of the logistic regression (insignificance of most of the factors) were as expected 
as the critique of credit rationing clearly found no statistically significant evidence of its 
effects as most of rationing criterion normally do not work perfectly. For instance, on 
collateral, Carbo-Valverde et al. (2015) proved that it failed as they found no strong 
evidence that increasing collateral leads to a borrower to repay the loan effectively.  On loan 
terms, Mutezo et al., (2015) argued that the longer the repayment period the riskier the 
borrower is to repay the loan. That is why there were more rejected loan applications. One 
of the factors was that most applicants requested longer repayment periods though they 
thought that the longer the period the more they are able they can repay the loans. Perhaps 








SUMMARY, CONCUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the study and the route to conclusion and recommendations. It 
starts with the main objective of the study with the specific objectives, research 
methodology, summary of the findings, the conclusion drawn from the results of the 
analysis. Some limitations of the analysis results and recommendations drawn from the 
results are given at the end. 
 
5.2 Objective of the study 
The main objective of this study was to empirically investigate socio-economic factors that 
act as barriers to access to DFI lending by SMEs using a secondary dataset of loan applicants 
that was obtained from the CBE. Supplementary to the main objective, the dissertation had 
two subsidiary objectives: (1) to examine the relationships between credit rationing factors 
that affect SMEs to access DFI loans in Eswatini and (2) to analyse how credit-rationing 
factors affect SMEs to access DFI loans in Eswatini.  
 
5.3 Study methodology 
The research questions were investigated through a quantitative research method which 
followed the explanatory research design in order to collect and analyse quantitative data 
on variables in order to measure the extent of access to debt finance (dependent variable) 
on a binary scale of “1” access and “0” no access and its determinants (independent 
variables). Taking into account the nature of the dependent variable (LAS) – dichotomous 
and seven independent variables (refer to Table 2), namely loan amount, age of SME, 
location, gender of the owner, loan term, collateral offered and interest rate to investigate 
the extent to which these factors affect SMEs’ access to DFI lending, a binary logistic 
regression modelling was applied as an analysis tool for the study. This was preceded by 
correlation analysis. Hypotheses were tested to back up the claims of existence of credit 




factors (variables) used in the analysis to determine its importance in the outcome of loan 
application process. 
5.4 Summary of the work done 
Credit rationing, an action taken by lending institutions to limit or deny access to credit 
based on borrower’s worthiness mainly due to lender imposed has both worked and not 
worked as it is mainly situation based. This study concentrated on this lender-imposed credit 
rationing where DFIs in Eswatini have adopted to assess SMEs application process. Despite 
the government’s strong emphasis in its National Policy on SMEs that for Eswatini to meet 
the challenges it faces in increasing the prosperity of the Swazi Nation there is a need to 
increase entrepreneurial activity in the country through enhancement of the environment in 
which businesses are set up, established and endeavour to grow, needs to be conducive to 
enterprise. To this end, the KoE stressed increased effort to channel funds to businesses 
from micro-finance institutions, private sources and from the commercial banking sector. 
There are still some SMEs that are struggling to survive through inability to access financial 
assistance 15 years after the launch of the policy.  
5.5 Summary of the findings 
The findings in relation to the main research objective indicates that SMEs in Eswatini face 
obstacles in accessing DFI services through the application of credit rationing. The results 
of the correlation analysis show that there is an association between all variables with the 
direction (the signs of correlation coefficients) and strength (the actual values of the 
correlation coefficients) of the linear association using Pearson Correlation Coefficient. 
This means that the chosen variables were in the same family of characteristics of SMEs 
and are related to some extent but not strong. The negative sign means that as one variable 
changes in magnitude (increases) the other one decreases while those with positive sign 
means that as one increases so does the other. The lowest correlation is -0.001, which was 
between loan amounts and gender of applicant while the highest was between loan terms 
and collateral with a correlation coefficient of 0.242. Multicollinearity, which is an issue in 
regression modelling was not present as all correlation coefficients were below the required 
benchmark of 60 between these variables. 
 
The output of logistic regression analysis shows the results of estimation of the logist ic 
model of loan applicants with the Wald values and factor change – odds ratios with their 




zero, the coefficient for loan application status is -0.597 with a corresponding odds ratio of 
0.551. For an application to succeed in most of DFIs in Eswatini the only determining 
factors are age of their businesses (which has a coefficient of -0.012, Wald of 7.770, a p-
value of 0.005 and an odds ratio of 0.998) and loan amount applied which has a coefficient 
of 0.001, Wald of 4.857and a p-value of 0.028 and an odds ratio of 1.045). So from the 
result above, only age of the business and loan amount applied are found to be statistically 
significant affecting loan acquisition in Eswatini. For younger SMEs in age, the log odds of 
accessing a loan (versus not accessing a loan) decreases by about 99 points. While for one-
unit change in loan amount applied by SMEs, the log odds of accessing a loan (versus not 
accessing a loan) decreases by about 5 points when other necessary variables are not 
considered.  
 
Overall, the model has the explanatory power of somewhere between 42 (Cox and Snell R 
Squared) and 51 percent (Nagelkerke R Squared) of the variance of probability of getting a 
loan. This means that loan applicants (SMEs) have little or no chance of acquiring a loan to 
cushion their weak economic muscles for business growth. This was because most of them 
were in their early start-up stage without much needed business experience in terms of 
management of resources, which is one of the conditions set by financial institutions for the 
access of their loan services. On the other hand, the amount of the loan applied for should 
be below or within their collateral as no lending institution can risk its capital to businesses 
that have a shallow financial base. The only source of hope is mainly outside microfinance 
institutions that can include friends, relatives and other well-wishers. The analysis in this 
study points to the fact that SMEs in Eswatini are feeling the heat from DFIs. The non-
significance of the five (5) used socio-economic factors (variables) namely, interest rate, 
location, collateral, loan term and gender of the SME owner in determining the loan 
accessibility is the undisputable evidence that DFIs in Eswatini are applying credit rationing 
in their loan processing. 
 
Credit rationing, an action taken by lending institutions to limit or deny access to credit 
based on borrower’s worthiness mainly due to lender imposed has both worked and not 
worked as it is mainly situation based. This study concentrated on this lender-imposed credit 
rationing where DFIs in Eswatini have adopted to assess SMEs application process. Despite 




the challenges it faces in increasing the prosperity of the Swazi Nation, there is a need to 
increase entrepreneurial activity in the country through enhancement of the environment in 
which businesses are set up, established and endeavour to grow, needs to be conducive to 
enterprise. To this end KoE stressed on increased effort to channel funds to businesses from 
micro-finance institutions, private sources and from the commercial banking sector. There 
are still some SMEs that are struggling to survive through inability to access financial 
assistance 15 years after the launch of the policy. 
 
Although DFIs worldwide, including Eswatini, adopt lender-imposed credit rationing where 
factors such as gender of the applicants, location of the business, interest rates, age of SME, 
loan amounts applied, collateral and loan term, their practical effects are mixed. In Eswatini, 
most of these factors are not important, as far as lending is concerned, which is in tandem 
with other researchers (Cressy and Toivanen,2001); Abor and Biekpe,2009); Odit and 
Gobardhum,2011); Aterido et al., 2013); Anthony et al., 2013) including those that 
criticised them as not scientifically proven to be working positively. There might be other 
hidden factors that impact access to lending, such as the magnitude of each variable. Others 
work better if they are concentrated towards the higher side, while others need to be 
concentrated towards the lower side. This may mean that their presence does not suggest 
that they are important.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Among other unforeseeable factors that are overlooked by government economic policy 
makers and planners when thinking of programs like giving incentives to business entities 
is the analysis of their characteristics. Politically, the government wish to help them for 
economic development and growth while DFIs have their own rules and regulations. The 
findings point to the fact that the policy formulation in Eswatini was cosmetic and was not 
meant to help SMEs. Basing on the results of the analysis, it is, therefore concluded that 
most of the loan applicants were in their early start-up stage hence not enough experience 
to handle business transactions that are necessary for their growth. SMEs (loan applicants) 
should make sure they confine their loan requests within their economic base as most 
applied amounts were beyond their collateral, which was risky to lending institutions to 
release their funds to someone whom they are not sure that he/she shall be able to repay. 
The results of the analysis also revealed that there is no bias in handling loan applications. 




decisions were uniformly affecting loan applicants. This is despite gender, location, loan 
terms, interest rates regimes and collateral. In general, SMEs in Eswatini face difficulties in 
accessing DFI services. It is an undisputable fact that DFIs in Eswatini are applying credit 
rationing in their loan processing. As stated by Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998), the 
constrained access to loans could have a negative impact on the growth of the SME sector, 
with serious implications on poverty and unemployment. 
5.7 Recommendations 
Though it is an undisputed fact that SMEs are the backbone of economic development, it is 
also undisputed that they face financial challenges for their smooth growth. Based on the 
results of the analysis, for the survival of SMEs in Eswatini the following recommendations 
are drawn: 
1. Government economic policy makers should formulate policies that fit early start-
up business entities that are struggling to survive but they are denied access to loans 
due to their age. 
2. SMEs operators should be well informed of available policies of DFIs when they 
seek financial help so that they should not request what is beyond their economic 
base as this discourages DFIs to practically assist them. 
3. Encouraging SMEs to adopt village banking system that can help them locally as an 
alternative to financial assistance mechanism. These have lighter financial rules 
compared to those of DFIs and financial institutions.  
4. The dependent variable in this study was defined based on the demand-side response 
that only reflects the views of the borrowers. Therefore, future researchers on this 
topic in Eswatini should consider using the supply-side so that views of lenders are 
heard. Adding more explanatory variables include employment size, type of 
business, and many more SMEs characterises and test the impact of the magnitude 
of these variables to assess if they might add any value to the hindrances to loan 
access.   
5.8 Suggestion for future research 
The principles and data used in this dissertation could be extended for testing the effects of 
educational level, marital status, type of SME and credit history of borrowers in accessing 
loans from Eswatini DFIs. As secondary data used in this study were requested from CBE 




would be ideal to get some of this information and any other that can have an influence on 
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